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1. ABOUT THE IECEU - PROJECT 
T he IECEU, which stands for Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU) is a multinational project aiming at enhancing conflict prevention capabilities. This project has received fun-
ding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, HORIZON 
2020. The IECEU Consortium itself consists of a diverse group of civilian, research 
and military organizations. The members consist of 12 partners, from 7 different 
countries, and they are:
 
• Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Finland, Consortium Coordinator,  
www.laurea.fi) 
• Safer Globe (Finland, https://saferglobe.fi/)
• University of Ljubljana (Slovenia, https://www.uni-lj.si/eng/)
• Centre for European Perspective (Slovenia, www.cep.si)
• National University of Ireland Maynooth (Ireland, 
www.maynoothuniversity.ie)
• Austrian Institute for European and Security 
Policy (Austria, www.aies.at/english/)
• Royal Danish Defence College (Denmark, www.fak.dk/en)
• University of Roskilde (Denmark, https://ruk.dk/en)
• Enquirya (The Netherlands, www.enquirya.com)
• Crisis Management Centre Finland (Finland, www.cmcfinland.fi)
• Finnish Defence Forces International Centre (Finland, 
http://puolustusvoimat.fi/en/web/fincent)  
• As associated partner: European Security and Defence 
College (Belgium, www.eeas.europa.eu)
Through analyses and evaluations the project aims to identify the best practices and 
develop new approaches and solutions. In order to achieve the set goals, the IECEU 
project aims to strengthen cooperation between different actors, in the operatio-
nal context. The project looks to provide recommendations for the EU to guarantee 
long-term stability. The project had three main objectives and they are:
• to analyze the current situation of on-going and past EU CSDP missions and 
operations
• to learn from the lessons provided by these CSDP missions and to assess the 
different options
• to provide new solutions, approaches and recommendations for the EU, 
in order to guarantee long term stability, through conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding 
The responsibilities of IECEU research and development activities were spread 
among the IECEU Consortium partners. The methodology was co-created within 
all partners in the beginning of the project implementation as well as comparative 
analysis were finally concluded with participation of all partners. The work division 
within IECEU Consortium was as follows:
• Laurea UAS: lead of management, coordination, IECEU Learning 
Application, contribution to analysis 
• Safer Globe: lead of methodology, comparative analysis and capabilities
• University of Ljubljana: lead of research conducted in Balkans (Kosovo and 
BiH), research and analysis
• Centre for European Perspective: lead of dissemination, research in 
Balkans, contribution to analysis
• National University of Ireland Maynooth: research in Afghanistan, cont-
ribution to analysis
• Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy: lead of new 
approaches and solutions, research in South Sudan, contribution to analysis
• Royal Danish Defence College: lead of research conducted in Africa, 
research in DR Congo, contribution to analysis
• University of Roskilde: lead of effectiveness analysis
• Enquirya: lead of interoperability and pooling & sharing research, contri-
bution to analysis
• Crisis Management Centre Finland: lead of research conducted in occu-
pied Palestinian territories and Afghanistan, research in occupied Palestine 
Territories and Libya, contribution to analysis
• Finnish Defence Forces International Centre: research in Central African 
Republic, research of civil-military synergies, contribution to analysis
• European Security and Defence College: participation in facilitation 
policy dialogues and integration to training
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2. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE CAPABILITIES IN EU CONFLICT 
PREVENTION 
Kirsi Hyttinen, Laurea UAS
T he current global geopolitical changes, impacts of crisis and conflicts, radi-calization and global interconnectedness are growing potential for security threats and landscapes inside and outside of the European Union (EU). EU 
and its Member States have showed the commitment to CSDP after Lisbon Treaty. 
The key for EU is to aim towards improvement of its conflict preparedness and res-
ponse capabilities to create long-term impact and use the current resources even 
more effectively. With the research, the security challenges must be approached 
multidisciplinary and holistic in order to provide a solid foundation for informa-
tion gathering and evidence-based studies. The needs for effectiveness analyses of 
CSDP missions and operations as well as improvements towards more successful 
conflict prevention capabilities were addressed by European Commission in early 
2014. IECEU –project Consortium was established in 2015 in order to meet with these 
needs and to investigate solutions and approaches for longer term interventions and 
impacts. 
The researchers of IECEU –project Consortium studied the best practices and 
lessons identified of CSDP missions and operations (during years 2015-2017) with a 
view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding capabilities of 
EU. The analyses were conducted with use of comparative methods and set success 
indicators. IECEU conceptual framework and effectiveness (success) indicators built 
an overall understanding among researchers to examine the current EU capabilities 
in both military and civilian crisis management. The main data collection methods 
were desk study research, surveys, active observation and qualitative interviews of 
personnel representing EU CSDP operation, EEAS, EU institutes, other internatio-
nal organisations, local authorities, and local population. In total 12 different opera-
tions (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo, Operation 
Artemis, EUAVSEC, South Sudan, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, EUBAM Libya, 
EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah) and 265 interviews were 
analysed during years 2016 and 2017. Further, a deeper focus related to pooling and 
sharing, interoperability and civilian military synergies was built with use of mixed 
methods in data collection. Currently, under CSDP, EU has currently sixteen (16) 
on-going military and civilian operations or missions. Most of the mandates focus 
on assisting, monitoring, capacity building and training. 
The EU can have the biggest influence in the early stage of the conflicts and crisis. The 
improvements for conflict prevention mechanisms and more effective preparedness 
in early stage of the conflict can benefit EU long-term. The current conflicts and crisis 
cannot be overcome solely by military or civilian means alone, which requires better 
civil-military synergies, potentials for pooling and sharing and integrated approach. 
IECEU research led towards a catalogue of practices in CSDP missions, and proposal 
of new solutions and approaches. It found out how to increase the interoperability 
of resources in the crisis management and peacebuilding and what the potential for 
pooling and sharing of EU capabilities and technologies. The studies of IECEU show 
the necessity of further implementation of mechanisms and tools for conflict pre-
vention whereas the lessons identified in CSDP missions and operations may benefit 
these processes. The developments in planning capabilities, understanding of grass-
root causes, civil-military interoperability process, promotion of local ownership as 
central for the sustainability and legitimacy of the CSDP efforts in host country, and 
support of technologies and information sharing systems in CSDP, were addressed 
by IECEU research. Since CSDP missions are implemented by civilian means with 
understanding of “soft power”, the improvements for soft skills and competen-
ces of the personnel deployed in operations were highlighted. Hence, IECEU case 
studies with use of similar conceptual framework were just a peak; an establish-
ment of overall system for measuring the effectiveness of EU’s CSDP activities could 
further identify the possible shortfalls and potentials. 
This publication summarises the work of IECEU Consortium and its deliverables. 
The content of this publication is summarised based on the work conducted by dif-
ferent organisations and researchers of the IECEU. Firstly, we introduce our unique 
approach for H2020 project dissemination through extensive networks. Secondly, 
the case study findings and recommendations in terms of effectiveness and prac-
tices are introduced in order. Thirdly, the results of use of co-created conceptual fra-
mework will gather the comparative analysis from case study findings. Fourthly, the 
potentials for interoperability in CSDP are described as key findings from analysis 
completed in IECEU work. The implementation of H2020 –funded project requires 
a set of new skills and competences from personnel participating to large research, 
innovation and support activities. In IECEU –project we identified a tailored model 
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for project management and coordination. The Project Management Handbook1 
describes the methodologies and activities implemented from the project mana-
gement perspectives and gathers the good practices from this project. As IECEU 
Consortium Coordinator, I sincerely hope the readers to benefit of different results 
of IECEU; from project dissemination and management until research findings on 
effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations as well as policy level and academic 
recommendations. Moreover, I kindly thank for all contributors in this publication 
and trhoughout the IECEU –project implementation in years 2014-2018.  
IECEU Consortium. From left: Kieran Doyle (Kennedy Institute), Ivana Boštjančič Pul­
ko (CEP), Blaž Grilj (University of Ljubljana),  Jyrki Ruohomäki (CMC Finland), Kari 
Sainio (FINCENT), Markko Kallonen (Laurea UAS), Kirsi Hyttinen (Laurea UAS), 
Arnold Kammel (AIES), Mascia Toussaint (Enquirya), Thomas Mandrup (RDDC), 
Elisa Norvanto (FINCENT), Hannu Nyqvist (Laurea UAS), Maria Mekri (Safer­
Globe), Jyrki Ruohomäki (CMC Finland), William Matchett (Kennedy Institute), 
Raffaele Marchetti 
References:
Hyttinen, K. 2017. Project Management Handbook. ISBN: 978-951-799-452-1 
(online)
1) Hyttinen, K. 2017. Project Management Handbook. ISBN: 978­951­799­452­1 (online)
3. IECEU DISSEMINATION 
Meliha Muherina, CEP & Kirsi Hyttinen & Peter Österlund, Laurea UAS
A dissemination plan for the IECEU-project was delivered on 2 July 2015, as a part 
of Work Package 8, by the Centre for European Perspective (CEP). After success-
ful implementation of dissemination activities in IECEU, we aim to present the 
IECEU Dissemination Framework to the reader, in a shorter, more concise form. 
“Development of dissemination plan and relevant dissemination tools is a fundamental part 
of the IECEU project in order to keep the ongoing activities of the project visible to audience 
and engage the main partners in an interactive approach, to receive relevant feedback.“ 
(IECEU, 2015 D8.1 Dissemination Plan)
Dissemination activities are one of the most relevant features of a project, as they 
amplify the engagement of different stakeholders in order to reach the set project 
goals. Dissemination done in IECEU has been keeping the ongoing activities of the 
project visible to audiences, engaging the main stakeholders and end-users (acade-
mic as well as practitioners) in an interactive approach, and receiving relevant feed-
back. Main objectives of the dissemination of IECEU have been:
• to ensure the end users, stakeholders and beneficiaries of the information 
are actively involved and to enhance their interest
• to ensure efficient dissemination of the project goals, activities, progress 
achievements and findings between project participants and wider public
• to gain relevant feedback and constant evaluation of the project achieve-
ments and preliminary research findings
• to participate and report in relevant forums to disseminate results, achieve-
ments, findings and recommendations
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• to provide the consortium with a strategic framework to allow dissemina-
tion of work and results of IECEU
• information collected from each partner enabled the consortium to notice 
gaps in reaching specific identified end user groups and different dis-
semination tools so that performance could have been improved during the 
project duration.
IECEU dissemination has started with establishment of the 
• Website [http://www.ieceu-project.com/]
• Facebook page [https://www.facebook.com/pages/IECEU-Improving-
Effectiveness-of-Capabilities-in-EU-Conflict-Prevention/1027313927286450] 
• Twitter account [https://twitter.com/ieceuproject]. 
Social media accounts have been used to share all the most important developments 
in the project, publications and participation at various seminars, conferences 
and lectures. Facebook has 399 likes on its page, while 407 people are following it. 
Average reach of our Facebook posts was 1000 people. Twitter account on the other 
hand has 506 followers and 156 likes. 
The dissemination plan represented n important tool when trying to ease the dis-
semination of results and activities towards relevant actors. In the Horizon 2020 
Rules for Participation, dissemination is, roughly defined, as publicly disclosing 
the results by any means accepted, including scientific publications. Another 
important goal is to spread information and knowledge to a well-targeted, wider 
audience. The main objective of IECEU Dissemination and Exploitation  was to 
provide information, in a more general way, on the project and its results to the 
interested public and, of course, to the relevant stakeholders. The development of a 
dissemination plan and relevant dissemination tools is an integral part of the pro-
ject, in order to keep ongoing project activities visible to audiences and to engage 
the main stakeholders and end-users. IECEU Dissemination was an important tool 
for raising awareness about the project and importance of research in the field of 
CSDP as a systemic approach to information sharing among stakeholders.
The Dissemination Methodology 
The dissemination was divided into three phases, before the project, during the pro-
ject and not so surprisingly, after the project. The specific objectives of the metho-
dology were: 
• To develop differentiated communication tools, addressing various stake-
holders and end-user groups (for example EU policy makers, CSDP mission 
representatives, academia, training community) in communicating project 
objectives, activities, results and their relevance
• To carry out the dissemination of project results through a variety of dif-
ferent communication tools. Tools such as the project website and social 
media platforms, just to mention a couple of examples
• To define the activities to be facilitated before, during and after the IECEU 
project 
To be able to address the project objectives and achieve the above-mentioned aims 
effectively, the dissemination plan provided an overall framework for managing and 
coordinating communications that directly and indirectly take place within the pro-
ject. The selection for network based approach and use of extensive networks of each 
beneficiaries in the Consortium ensured the success of dissemination. Moreover all 
beneficiaries had the resources committed only for dissemination. Already in the 
early stage of the project implementation, the dissemination plan identified more 
specifically:
• the key stakeholders and end users 
• who are the target groups of the information
• what messages does IECEU want to convey to each target group 
• the use of proper tools
• how the messages will be communicated
• who will communicate the messages and how 
• when will the messages be communicated 
Kirsi Hyttinen (left) and Markko Kallonen from Laurea UAS at dissemination activities
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Tools Used
Proper dissemination tools allow easier access to project information, activities, 
findings and results. In the IECEU - project these tools are combination of the follo-
wing activities: (1) The developing of a communication and dissemination strategy, 
(2) Setting up the digital online channels, such as IECEU website, social media tools 
and discussion boards, (3) Preparing communication material, such as press relea-
ses, PR letters, newsletters and videos, (4) The organizing support and coordination 
activities such as events, workshops, round table discussions, trainings, policy dia-
logues, expert discussions, on online discussionsand arranging a final conference, 
to mention the most relevant ones, (5) And finally to integrate it all with relevant 
training and education in the field. 
The most important part of the project dissemination and communication was the 
development of differentiated communication tools that address various stake-
holders (e.g. EU policy makers, CSDP mission representatives, academia, training 
community, think tanks, NGOs) in communicating project objectives, activities and 
results.The active communication through communication tools (e.g. project web-
site, the media, social media platforms, developed communication material) played 
a crucial role to reach the relevant end users. The website aims at assuring sustai-
nability and also, to encompass relevant information about the project and its acti-
vities. The website includes the secured internal website for Consortium use only. 
The social media tools will support the dissemination and the project has its own 
Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn accounts. 
D1.1 Review: from short term stabi-
lisation to long term peacebuilding, 
SaferGlobe 
D1.2 Analysis of the current preventi-
ve activities, CMC Finland 
D1.3 Review of civilian and military 
synergies, FINCENT
D1.4 Identifying the success factors 
(indicators), Roskilde University
D1.5 IECEU conceptual framework, 
SaferGlobe 
D2.1 The Kosovo review, University of 
Ljubljana 
D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina review, 
FINCENT
D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, University of 
Ljubljana
D2.4 Balkans: Discussion report (best 
practices), University of Ljubljana 
D2.5 Balkans: Conclusion report, 
University of Ljubljana
D3.1 RD Congo review, Royal Danish 
Defense College 
D3.2 South Sudan review, AIES
D3.3 Central African Republic review, 
FINCENT
D3.4 Libya review, CMC Finland 
D3.5 Study Report of RD Congo, South 
Sudan, CAR and Libya, Royal Danish 
Defense College
D3.6 Africa: Discussion report (best 
practices), Royal Danish Defense 
College
D3.7 Africa: Conclusion report, Royal 
Danish Defense College
D4.1 Palestine Territory, CMC Finland
D4.2 Afghanistan review, NUIM – 
Kennedy Institute
D4.3 Study Report of Palestine 
Territory and Afghanistan, NUIM – 
Kennedy Institute
D4.4 Discussion report (Palestine Ter-
ritory and Afghanistan), CMC Finland 
D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Concusion 
Report, CMC Finland 
D5.1 The effectiveness of EU capabi-
lities and current situation of pooling 
and sharing, SaferGlobe
D5.2 Design and development proces-
ses of the NMLA, Laurea
D5.3 NMLA Handbook, LAUREA
D5.4 Training for the trainers curricu-
la, CEP 
D5.5 Evaluation report , CEP
D6.1 Standardisation review: Compa-
ring the analysis, Enquirya 
D6.2 Identification of the overlap, 
AIES
D6.3 Review of the interoperability of 
the resources, Enquirya
D6.4 Policy Dialogue, AIES
D6.5 The potential for pooling and 
sharing the EU capabilities, Enquirya 
Report 
D7.1 The improvement of the effecti-
veness of EU capabilities, SaferGlobe 
D7.2 New Policy Approaches and so-
lutions (including research priorities), 
Enquirya 
D7.3 Preventive activities for pre-exis-
ting structures, AIES 
D7.4 Minutes of the Policy Dialogue, 
AIES
D8.1 Dissemination plan, CEP 
D8.2 Advisory and Integration Wor-
king Group, Laurea
D8.3 Website and online discussion 
board, Laurea
D8.4 Press Releases and Recording of 
dissemination
D8.5 Integration plan (to the relevant 
trainings), CEP
D8.6 Conference agenda, Laurea
D9.1 Steering Committee, Laurea
D9.2 Project Management Handbook, 
Laurea
D9.3 Assessment of the project deve-
lopment, Enquirya
D9.4 Project Quality Plan, Laurea
D9.5 Conflict Resolution Procedures, 
Laurea
D9.6 Copies of ethical approvals by 
the competent Ethics Committee, 
Laurea
IECEU Dissemination productions
IECEU Deliverables:
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IECEU Lectures, Round Tables and Policy Dialogues:
• Policy Dialogue organized by Laurea and AIES on 2nd May 2017 in Helsinki 
focused on CSDP crisis management operations, training organisation and 
staff competences as well as CSDP crisis management operations and the 
comprehensive approach.
• Policy Dialogue organized by Enquirya, NUIM Kennedy Institute and Laurea 
University of Applied Sciences took place in Brussels on 27th April 2017, 
discussed the findings of eight IECEU case studies with special focus on 
planning and technologies in CSDP civilian and military crisis management.
• Policy Dialogue organized by AIES and ESDC took place in Brussels on 27th 
March 2017, and presented findings related to civil-military interoperability 
of the EU’s crisis management interventions and civil-military interface in 
its approaches to crisis management.
• End User Advisory Working Group organized by CEP and University of 
Ljubljana, took place in Ljubljana on 25th January 2017. It presented the 
pre liminary findings of IECEU project research on eight different CSDP 
missions and gained relevant feedback from the stakeholders.
• CEP organized a Round table discussion of experts in Ljubljana, Slovenia, on 
24th May 2016, to gain experts feedback on conclusions from two field trips 
(BiH and Kosovo).
• “IECEU End User Advisory Working Group event” was organized by Laurea 
University of Applied Science in Tikkurila, Finland on 13th September. The 
aim of it was to keep stakeholders of the project involved and updated, as well 
as to receive feedback from them in order to ensure high-level dissemination 
for all the relevant stakeholders and end-users.
• Royal Danish Defence College organized a panel of experts to discuss the 
issues related to EU Common Security and Defence Policy initiatives in Africa. 
Event was held in Copenhagen between 31st October and 1st November 2016.
• National University of Ireland, Maynooth held a round table discussion on 
the field research - examining the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan, on 5th of 
October 2016.
• IECEU Advisory Board Meetings were organised by Laurea UAS in Brussels 
(2015, 2016, 2017) 
• Higher Education lectures in bachelor and master level multidisciplinary 
during years 2015-2017.
IECEU participation to international conferences in order to present findings 
of the project:
• KMIS – 9th International Conference on Knowledge Management and 
Information Sharing, 1-3 November 2017 in Portugal: presentation of the 
article “Human-centered design model in the developmend of online 
learning tools for international security training – case IECEU NMLA”
• EUPRERA 2017 Congress London, 12-14 October 2017, Presentation in Parallel 
Session Creative Strategies: Opportunities for PR based on scientific article 
by Harri Ruoslahti, Kristina Henriksson & Kirsi Hyttinen (2017) A Co-creative 
Model for Modern Communication and Dissemination in Multi-stakeholder 
Research Projects.
• Belgrade Security Forum, panellists on a panel “The EU as a crisis management 
actor: CSDP in neighbourhood”, held in Belgrade, between October 11th and 
13th.
• UACES (Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies) – 47th 
Annual Conference ’Exchanging Ideas on Europe’ held in Krakow, Poland, 
4-6 September 2017; presented findings on EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea 
and EUAVSEC, South Sudan. 
• Edu-LEARN – 9th annual International Conference on Education and 
New Learning Technologies, held in Barcelona (Spain), 3rd – 5th July, 2017; 
presented a paper on Development of IECEU e-learning platform and its 
integration into crisis management training.
• ’The EU and Global Challenges’, held in Florence, Italy, 3rd – 5th May, 
presented the activities and milestones of the CSDP peacekeeping missions 
and operations research.
• ISA Annual Convention, presented an article “EU crisis management: 
a meaningful contribution to preventing (further) violent conflict?” in 
Baltimore between 22nd and 25th February 2017.
• 4th Annual RACVIAC/KAS Conference on Security Challenges for Europe 
organized by RACVIAC-Centre for Security Cooperation in Dubrovnik on 
13th January. Held a lecture titled “The EU and its normative power in Kosovo: 
the question of EULEX”.
• Centre for International Policy Studies, Ottawa, Ontario on 13th of October 
2016. Participated as a panellist on a round table ”South Sudan: Breaking the 
Conflict Trap? The latest developments & options for Canada”, presenting 
findings from his field research in South Sudan.
• Belgrade Security Forum, 12-14th October 2016 in Belgrade, Serbia; 
participated as a panellist in a round table “Civilian capabilities in peace 
operations”.
• European Studies Day, 9th October 2015 in Helsinki, Finland; project 
presented.
18  19Kirsi Hyttinen, Pasi Hario & Peter Österlund (eds.) Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention
IECEU scientific and academic publications:
• Scientific article by Annemarie Peen Rodt & Rok Zupancic (2017) Improving 
the effectiveness of EU capabilities in operational conflict prevention: Best 
practices and lessons identified in the European Union Rule of Law Mission 
in Kosovo – EULEX. Cooperation and Conflict. ISSN: 0010-8367
• Paper by Petteri Taitto, Annalisa Creta Alberto di Martino & Mark Nemedim 
(2017) (scientific supervision by Andrea de Guttry) Civilian and Military 
Personnel in CSDP Missions and Operations. Policy Department, Directorate-
General for External Policies. European Union, 2017 ISBN: 978-92-846-0643-6 
(pdf )
• Scientific article by Kirsi Hyttinen (2017) Human-Centered design model in 
the development of learning environments for peacebuilding training, case 
IECEU, New Media Based Learning Application (NMLA).
• Publication by Kirsi Hyttinen (2017) Project Management Handbook. ISBN: 
978-951-799-452-1 (online). 
• Scientific article in the Journal ’Contemporary Military Challenges’: Assessing 
the Planning and Implementation of the EU Missions and Operations: Case 
Study of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Authors: Ivana Boštjančič 
Pulko, Johanna Suhonen, Kari Sainio. Available at http://www.slovenskavo-
jska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/2017/svi_19_3.pdf.
• Scientific journal European Perspectives was published containing five 
articles based on IECEU project research of the Western Balkans missions, 
EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea [http://www.cep.si/journal/latest-issue] 
and contains the following articles:
• The European Union and the (R)Evolution of its Strategy of Conflict 
Prevention by Dr. Rok Zupančič, University of Ljubljana
• The International Community and the European Union in the Western 
Balkans: from ‘Disinterest’ to ‘Active Participation’ by Jana Arbeiter and 
Dr. Boštjan Udovič, University of Ljubljana
• Assessing the Planning and Implementation of the EU Rule of Law 
Missions: Case study of EULEX Kosovo by Blaž Grilj and Dr. Rok 
Zupančič, University of Ljubljana
• Analyzing the Effectiveness of EUFOR Althea Operation in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina by Ivana Boštjančič Pulko and Meliha Muherina, CEP and 
Nina Pejič, University of Ljubljana
• Drawing Lessons Learnt on Operational Capabilities of EU’s CSDP 
Missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina by Ivana Boštjančič 
Pulko, CEP and Nina Pejič, University of Ljubljana
• Article “Analysing the effectiveness of EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina” written by Ivana Boštjančič Pulko and Meliha Muherina, 
CEP and, Nina Pejič, University of Ljubljana has been published in 
English and Bosnian by Centre for Security Studies BiH [http://css.ba/
research/#1495452541980-b7d8de73-aea5].
• Nina Pejič and Dr Rok Zupancic, University of Ljubljana, Artmir Galica, 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences and Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, CEP pub-
lished an article in Albanian on the effectiveness of EULEX Kosovo in sbun-
ker [https://sbunker.net/teh/88819/a-eshte-i-mundur-krijimi-i-nje-ndikimi-
te-qendrueshem-analize-e-efektivitetit-te-eulex/].
• Article on effectiveness of EULEX Kosovo written by Dr. Rok Zupancic and 
Nina Pejič from University of Ljubljana and Ivana Boštjančič Pulko, CEP, was 
published in Serbian at Beogradski Centar Za Bezbednosnu Politiku [http://
bezbednost.org/Sve-publikacije/6543/ Trajni-uticaj-EULEKSa-Analiza-
efikasnosti.shtml].
• An article written by Dr. Rok Zupančič, University of Ljubljana, 
“Challenges of (academic) fieldwork in post-conflict societies”, refle-
cted upon his field study in Kosovo. [https://eu-civcap.net/2017/07/01/
challenges-of-academic-fieldwork-in-post-conflict-societies/].
• - An article written by Kirsi Hyttinen and Markko Kallonen (2015) “How to 
improve EU’s conflict prevention activities to achieve long-term impact?”
• Working Paper by Robert Galavan (2015) Understanding Resources, 
Competences, and Capabilities in EU Common Security and Defence Policy 
(August 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693638 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2693638
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4. LESSONS FROM IECEU CASE 
STUDIES
Kirsi Hyttinen & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS
Foreword
IECEU –project analysed the effectiveness of eight different case study areas where 
the CSDP mission or operation has taken place. The analyses were conducted with 
use of comparative analysis and set success indicators. D1.5 Conceptual Framework 
and D1.4 Effectiveness (success) indicators built an overall understanding among 
researchers to examine the effectiveness of EU capabilities in both military and 
civilian crisis management operations. The main data collection methods were desk 
study research, surveys, active observation and qualitative interviews of personnel 
representing EU CSDP operation, EEAS, EU institutes, other international organisa-
tions, local authorities, and local population. In total 12 different operations (EULEX 
Kosovo, EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo, Operation Artemis, 
EUAVSEC, South Sudan, EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL 
Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah) and 265 interviews were analysed by 
IECEU -project Consortium researchers during years 2016 and 2017. Further, a deeper 
focus related to pooling and sharing, interoperability and civilian military synergies 
was built with use of mixed methods in data collection.
Joint Final Conference with WOSCAP -project
IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention) and 
WOSCAP (Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding) together orga-
nizes their Final Conference ”Effectiveness and Inclusivity of EU Peacebuilding and 
Conflict Prevention” that starts with an evening reception on November 7 (venue tbc) 
and continue on November 8, 2017 at the Scotland House in Brussels, Belgium. The 
conference aims to present both H2020 projects’ research results and recommen-
dations as well as to contribute to further debate and improvement in EU’s conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding interventions through sustainable, comprehensive 
and innovative means.
The speakers will include representatives from various EU institutions such as the 
EEAS (PRISM), DEVCO, and the ESDC, alongside academics and peacebuilding aca-
demics and practitioners from around the world, who have contributed to these pro-
jects. Civil society representatives and practitioners from different partner regions 
in the world, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mali, Georgia, Yemen and 
Ukraine will also participate in these debates. Various EU Member States, as well 
as representatives from the UN and OSCE are also expected to take part. We expect 
around 150 participants. The conference will specifically focus on:
• Main aspects of conflict prevention
• Integrated approach
• Effectiveness of EU missions and operations
• Potential for pooling and sharing in CSDP
• Civil-military cooperation in CSDP
• Inclusivity, local ownership and civil society perspectives in peacebuilding
For further reading:
D8.1 Dissemination Plan. 2015. IECEU, 653371.
D8.5 Final Conference Report. 2018. IECEU, 653371.
ANNEX 1: List of dissemination results 
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European Union CSDP missions in Kosovo and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
The EU’s aspirations to become a global actor, which also means the provider of secu-
rity and stability, have most significantly materialized in the region of the Western 
Balkans. There the EU has launched its most extensive, external involvement, inclu-
ding several CSDP missions and other forms of engagement, supporting countries, 
which have undergone a period of bloodshed in their very recent history.
The central point of its engagement has been aimed at Kosovo. Besides the CSDP 
mission (European Rule of Law Mission - EULEX), the EU has introduced numerous 
complementary activities, with a view to providing relevant incentives for long-term 
peace-building.3 The EU’s role in Kosovo since 1999 can be divided into four major 
sections: coordination of economic reforms, institution building, political reform, 
and ensuring security.4 To this, we should also add substantial humanitarian and 
developmental assistance from the EU, as well as its role in the reconstruction of 
Kosovo. Overall, “Kosovo is the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the world”.5 
On the other hand, EUFOR Althea is often referred to as the first major military 
operation of the EU and after twelve year of functioning, it is also known as the 
longest EU mission in its history.6 The EU’s relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) can be perceived to fall under two main elements; (1) EU’s political agenda 
seek ing to support the country’s EU integration process and (2) security focus 
seeking to enhance the safe and secure environment in the country through the 
CSDP.  
The EU’s diplomatic relations are represented in the country by a Delegation from 
the European Union. The EU Delegation promotes the EU’s interests and these 
are embodied in common policies relating to, among others, foreign and security 
issues, commerce, agriculture, fisheries, environment, transport, health and safety. 
The EU Delegation plays a key role in the implementation of the EU’s external finan-
cial assistance. This primarily relates to the funds allocated under the Instrument 
for Pre-Accession (IPA)7. In the context of the CSDP, the Council of the European 
3) James Ker­Lindsay, “The UN and the Post­intervention Stabilization of Kosovo,” Ethnopolitics 11 
no. 4 (2012): 392­405.
4) Dimitris Papadimitriou, Petar Petrov and Labinot Greicevci, “To Build a State: Europeanization, the 
EU Actorness and State­Building in Kosovo,” European Foreign Affairs Review 12 (2007): 219­238.
5) Cierco, T. and Reis, L., 2014. EULEX’s Impact on the Rule of Law in Kosovo. Revista de Ciencia Politica, 
33 (3), pp.645­663.
6) Knauer, J., 2011. EUFOR Althea: Appraisal and Future Perspectives of the EU’s Former Flagship 
Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bruges: College of Europe.
7) Between 2007 and 2013, BiH benefitted from €615 million from the Instrument for pre­accession assis­
tance (IPA) which aims at providing targeted financial assistance to countries, which are candidates and 
potential candidates for membership to the EU. A second phase of IPA, from 2014 – 2020 is now under 
way with at least €165 million allocated for BiH in the first stage. .In particular, IPA helps to strengthen 
democratic.
Case Studies in Balkans
Nina Pejic, University of Ljubljana, Ivana Boštjančič Pulko CEP, Elisa Norvanto 
Finnish Defence Forces International Center & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS
This chapter summarises the IECEU Work Package two’s (WP 2) deliverables and 
research conducted by University of Ljubljana, Center for European Perspectives and 
Finnish Defence Forces International Center during IECEU –project implementati-
on.2 The main objective of this chapter follows the D2.5 – Conclusion report, which 
assess the current state of three security institutions – the Kosovo police, the Kosovo 
Customs and the Armed forces of BiH – that benefited from two CSDP missions/ope-
rations in the Balkans (EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea). The main contri bution 
of this paper are the identified lessons and recommendations pertaining not 
only to EULEX and EUFOR Althea, but also to CSDP in general. The intention 
of this approach is two-fold: first, to provide the argumentative deliberations for 
future action with regard to the eventual modifications in EULEX and EUFOR Althea 
(implementation in practice), and second, to serve as a point of departure for the 
work in the subsequent Work Packages of the IECEU-project (WP5, WP6, WP7).  
2) More on the deliverables. D2.1 The Kosovo Review. 2016. IECEU, 653371. D2.2 The Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Review. 2017. IECEU, 653371. D2.3 Study Report on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2016. IECEU, 
653371. D2.4 Round­table Discussion of Experts. 2016. IECEU, 653371. D2.5 2.5 The Conclusion report. 
2016. IECEU, 653371.
IECEU visiting the HQ Althea
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Union has mandated a European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR) and 
the European Union Force Althea (hereafter referred as EUFOR Althea). The EU’s 
Special Representative has the mandate to reinforce the EU’s political support for 
its policy objectives in BiH. The EUSR offers advice and facilitation support in the 
political process to institutions at all levels, aimed at ensuring greater consistency 
and coherence of all political, economic and European priorities – particularly in the 
areas of the rule of law and security sector reform.8 The EUSR is also responsible for 
the co-ordination of the EU’s public communication in BiH, and for contributing 
to a culture of respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms. The EUSR 
reports to the Council through the High Representative for EEAS/Vice President of 
the Commission.
Identified lessons and recommendations for EU CSDP
When CSDP military operations and civilian missions begin, the expectations of 
local communities, as well as the ambitions of the EU and its member states, are 
usually high. This does not come as a surprise, as they are often seen as a remedy 
coming from the developed world to heal all the problems of conflict- and post-con-
flict society. Nevertheless, if the mission or the operation from its beginning steps 
does not aim at creating a functioning state, or at least providing a higher degree of 
safety, security and the rule-of-law, then such a mission or operation is doomed to 
fail. However, also the political environment in the receiving country (aspirations 
to improve the current state of affairs) must be positive, allowing the mission or 
operation to conduct the tasks within its mandate. This means that the local security 
providers must be able to contain any disruption that might occur. However, these 
ambitious goals, cannot be achieved solely by the efforts of a CSDP civilian mission 
or military operation. They require a strong political commitment of major actors on 
the ground, local ownership, economic development, functional state institutions 
and a coordinated will and actions of other international actors involved in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding efforts in the conflict or post-conflict society. 
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the analysis of EULEX’s perfor-
mance in Kosovo focused on two ‘beneficiary institutions’ only – the Customs and 
the Police - while the Judiciary, which on one hand symbolizes EULEX in Kosovo, 
was not specifically addressed, as this was not envisaged in the Grant Agreement. 
The reasons for choosing this approach are explained in the deliverables of WP2. 
Therefore, this conclusion and the above-mentioned recommendations should be 
read with this in mind. 
To summarize WP 2 “The Balkans” and to understand the findings, it has to be 
emphasized that CSDP missions and operations were primarily devised as a short 
term conflict prevention and crisis management instrument. However, as we have 
8) ‘Our role’, Website of the Delegation of the European Union to BiH & European Union Special 
Representative in BiH, at http://europa.ba/?page_id=462, accessed 12 July 2016.
seen in the analysis of both CSDP “engagements” in the Balkans - EUFOR Althea and 
EULEX - have rather been used as long-term post-conflict capacity for institution 
building. Hence, one of the first discussions that should be resolved in the EU is 
whether it would be more suitable for the missions and operations to be deployed in 
the long run too. If the answer is positive, then the mandates and general approach 
of the EU should be adapted accordingly. This is of a particular importance in the 
light of the new EU Global Strategy, stating that CSDP “must become” more respon-
sive and setting the EU approach very ambitiously. According to the Strategy, the 
EU will even expand its understanding of a ‘comprehensive approach’, reaffirming 
that “the EU will act at all stages of the conflict cycle, acting promptly on prevention, respon­
ding responsibly and decisively to crises, investing in stabilization, and avoiding premature 
disengagement when a new crisis erupts”.9  
The analysis has also shown that the current method of planning and deploying 
missions and operations faces serious challenges, which hinder the general effec-
tiveness of CSDP. In this regard, it might be useful to explore whether the deployed 
missions could complement each other. Some such cases are already emerging and 
they will be explored further in WP6, which focuses on the pooling and sharing. It is 
also worth asking to what extent the CSDP missions and operations could comple-
ment the work of internal security institutions. 
9) European Union External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe A 
Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy” accessed  July 15, 2016, http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/EUGS.pdf
IECEU members visiting EULEX Kosovo
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The lack of a clear end-state or exit strategy for both EULEX and EUFOR Althea 
does not help in preventing the CSDP engagements from being seen as ‘eternal’ and 
without ‘feasible goals’ by the local communities that should benefit from CSDP. 
Another challenge hampering the effectiveness of both EULEX and EUFOR Althea, is 
the issue of adequate pre-deployment training of personnel, as there are significant 
differences in the levels of preparedness, situational awareness, and professionalism 
among the staff representing ‘the EU flag’. Moreover, the challenge of providing the 
deployed personnel with the necessary language skills - English and local languages 
- has persisted ever since the inception of CSDP more than a decade ago. 
In spite of these shortcomings, there are certain successes in regards to both EULEX 
and EUFOR Althea that are explained more profoundly in the Work Package delive-
rables. The authors of this report thus challenge the popular (or better, populist) 
belief that CSDP does not work (or even exist) at all, by providing quite a few examples 
proving that the EU’s engagement did contribute to several positive results within 
the Kosovo Customs, the Kosovo Police, and the Armed Forces of BiH.  
We continue to question the EU’s engagement in the rule of law reform in Kosovo, 
when its success was limited and related to only two institutions – the Police and the 
Customs -, thus leaving judiciary as the crucial institution mainly unreformed and 
without real power, as the most serious crime allegations have not been addressed 
adequately. If the EU (through EULEX and other engagements) seems not to be fully 
committed to the reform of the rule of law, prioritizing stability to the actual reform 
of the rule of law, it is logical to question the sense of this reform, as it is impossible 
to implement the rule of law without a functioning, professional and independent 
judiciary. 
Among the findings that should be put into a comparative perspective, it was 
noted that in both Kosovo and BiH, that the factors threatening security and safety 
have, first and foremost, for several years been socio-economic, starting with 
unemploy ment and health-care issues and extending to the processes contributing 
to terrorism. Therefore, the discrepancy in terms of security is obvious. The current 
fields of EULEX and EUFOR Althea’s work are - with a notable exception of EULEX’s 
engagement in establishing the rule-of-law in Kosovo - to a large extent, far from 
people’s everyday life. 
Furthermore, the analysis of EULEX and EUFOR Althea has shown that the EU’s 
engagement, be it civilian or military, cannot succeed without the alignment of the 
policies of major international actors in the area. With regard to the Balkans, this 
would mean the EU-US alignment in particular, while the alignment of CFSP/CSDP 
with the Russian Federation, like it or not, might be more challenging to achieve due 
to the reasons pertaining to the domain of the ‘realpolitik’. If this strategic align-
ment of major actors is not reached, the positive contribution of the EU’s engage-
ment remains limited to the tactical (low) level (e. g. improving the work of police 
in dealing with the traffic safety and petty crime, better performance of customs, 
certain administrative reforms …), while the main objectives of the missions or ope-
rations, which are of a more strategic nature (e.g. fighting corruption and organized 
crime), remain unsolved. 
Even substantial financial and human resources spent on CSDP missions and opera-
tions by the EU cannot be of great help in the absence of a genuine aspiration from 
the EU (including its member states) and the US, to go after those political and eco-
nomic elites facing the allegations of criminal activities.10 This would however, as 
argued by many authors, require renewed negotiations between the US government 
and the Europeans. If this level of misalignment between influential actors per-
sists, then the criticism arguing that the EU (and the West in general) should either 
strengthen its level of intervention to bring about a real change in the governance, 
or withdraw substantially and continue providing only limited support, remains 
justified. 
On the other hand, it comes as no surprise that the EU and its member states, or 
even the US, in general, do not get involved strategically and comprehensively, as the 
problems, at least for now, seem to be “locally contained” from a security perspec-
tive. Political leaders of the countries in the region, with some rare exceptions, gene-
rally enjoy the support of the West and are well aware what the EU, drowning in its 
own problems, wants: this is the Balkans, where problems are contained within the 
territory without imminent spillover potential to inflame the wider region (again). 
10) The allegations and rumors that certain members of political elites are involved in criminal acti­
vities echo also in the reports of credible institutions. Let us mention, for example, a 2010 Council of 
Europe report, which, quoting two German intelligence analyses dating from 2005 and 2007, argues that 
much of the current leadership of three main political parties in Kosovo are key personalities of organized 
crime. Although the elites who are rumored to be involved in criminal activities often say that if there 
are allegations, then it is correct that the court cases commence, this might be difficult to implement, 
as much of evidence has been destroyed or that the key persons who could have brought the evidence 
forward have no reason for doing so, as also they enjoy certain benefits from it, or do not dare to point 
fingers at misbehavior.
IECEU­delegation visiting Bosnia and Hertzegovina
But, this certainly comes at the expense of the rule-of-law, a lower level of corrup-
tion, and a general democratization and stabilization in the EU’s neighboring count-
ries, remaining more wishful thinking than reality. This might be one of the most 
important conclusions of the Work Package. 
In spite of these shortcomings, there are certain successes in regards to both EULEX 
and EUFOR Althea that are explained more profoundly in the Work Package delive-
rables. The authors of this report thus challenge the popular (or better, populist) 
belief that CSDP does not work effectively and successfully at all, by providing quite 
a few examples proving that the EU’s engagement did contribute to several positive 
results – they are visible in the case of the customs and police work in Kosovo, as well 
as the in the functioning of the Armed Forces of BiH. 
For further reading:
D2.1 The Kosovo Review. 2016. IECEU, 653371. 
D2.2 The Bosnia and Herzegovina Review. 2017. IECEU, 653371. 
D2.3 Study Report on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2016. IECEU, 
653371. 
D2.4 Round-table Discussion of Experts. 2016. IECEU, 653371. 
D2.5 The Conclusion report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
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Case Studies in Africa: DR Congo, South Sudan, Central 
African Republic, Libya 
IECEU studied four different case countries and seven different missions and ope-
rations in total. The African Case Study Work Package (WP3) was led by Roskilde 
University and Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC). RDDC also conducted 
the research on DR Congo. The contributors for this research task in IECEU were 
Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES, conducted the research 
on South Sudan), Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland (conducted the research 
on Libya) and Finnish Defence Forces International Center (FINCENT, conducted 
the research on Central African Republic). The variation of the mission nature, size, 
objective, budget, priority, context of operation and so forth was huge within the 
case studies. The analysed military operations of EU “had the feature in common that 
the medium to long term impact on the security situation in host countries were limited, but 
that was not the objective of the operations. The four other missions analysed in the diffe­
rent studies in this report are all directly or in­directly part of post­conflict capacity building 
efforts in South Sudan, DRC and Libya, and therefore involved in precisely the longer term 
objective of creating lasting peace and security, and therefore having a long­term impact.”. 
A key feature of the African case studies in IECEU –project, were the findings related 
to lack of information sharing and expertise of EU personnel especially in terms of 
language skills. “Basically the French speaking missions constitute a challenge especially to 
the countries in Northern and Eastern Europe and can explain why it was difficult to get troop 
and staff commitments from these states in these missions.” The summary of the African 
case study research in IECEU consolidated the case study findings into the strategic 
level “EU is still an alliances of independent states, and cannot be analyzed without taking 
the national interests into consideration”.11  
EUAVSEC South Sudan – a relatively unknown EU mission in a 
difficult environment
Arnold Kammel, Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy (AIES)
Immediately after South Sudan became an independent country on 9 July 2011, all 
major international actors including the EU pledged their support for the develop-
ment of the new-born country. Within the framework of CSDP, the decision was 
taking to deploy an aviation security mission to Juba International Airport (JIA), as 
South Sudan became a landlocked country after independence and thus keeping JIA 
open under the standards of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (IACO) 
was of utmost importance. The mission, however, never reached its full operatio-
nal capacity and due to the deterioration of the situation in South Sudan after the 
11) IECEU, 2016. D3.7 Conclusion Report Africa.
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outbreak of the civil war had to be evacuated. The chapter will look into the main 
challenges the mission was confronted with as well as highlight some lessons learnt 
out of EUAVSEC. 
Introduction
South Sudan gained its independence in 2011 after decades of civil war and ethnic 
violence in the former common territory of Sudan. Although the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 set the provisions for a government of national 
unity, new governance institutions needed to be set up from scratch and reconci-
liation became crucial between those that were already participating in the gover-
nment of national unity in Khartoum and those who fought for freedom and inde-
pendence. As a consequence of the strong role of the tribes in South Sudan, the 
country has never had an effective central government and it has struggled with 
recurrent insurgencies and ethnic violence. Despite the assumption that most of the 
tensions would continue to exist between the two then divided nations Sudan and 
South Sudan, it turned out that shortly after the independence of South Sudan, the 
clashes within the tribal structures of South Sudan led to turmoil and weakened the 
stability of the country. However, despite the efforts of UNMISS (United Nations 
Mission in South Sudan) to provide for stability, the majority of the international 
actors focused on state and institution-building, thus partly neglecting other deve-
lopments within the country. 
In preparation for South Sudan’s independence, the EU upgraded its representation 
to a full delegation in May 2011 and inaugurated the European Union compound in 
Juba. At the independence celebration of 9 July 2011, the then HR/VP of the EU, Lady 
Baroness Ashton, declared that “[W]e will be your partner in achieving this, not just 
now, but for the long term. This partnership will be focused on helping the people of South 
Sudan, through working together with their government” (Ashton, 2011). Already before 
the independence celebrations took place, the Council agreed on 20 June 2011 to fol-
low a comprehensive approach to Sudan and South Sudan with, inter alia, the aim 
of assisting South Sudan to become a viable, stable, and prosperous state (Council 
of the EU, 2011, p. 2). Thus, four options regarding the mandate were presented to 
the Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU (Jandl, 2012, p. 495): improving 
aviation security at the airport of Juba, supporting the border management between 
Sudan and South Sudan, establishment of a river police and customs authority on 
the Nile and establishment of a criminal police force and of criminal investigation 
authorities and institutions in South Sudan. The PSC decided to go for the first 
option, an aviation security mission for the airport of Juba.
The setup of the mission and its impact
EUAVSEC South Sudan followed the usual paths of establishment. The three most 
important changes were the failure or unwillingness by the Government of South 
Sudan to build a new passenger terminal according to ICAO standards, the lack of 
commitment by senior officials to participate in the trainings and thirdly, the high 
illiteracy rate of the people to be trained. According to mission staff, the trainings 
had to start from scratch instead of providing basic civil aviation security training. 
Furthermore, the mission lacked from the beginning the basic security and IT equip-
ment and in terms of interoperability, the mission personnel underlined that the 
relationship between EU institutions in Brussels and the UN Headquarter was not 
properly working and the UN in New York was not at all willing to assist the mission 
in setting up the headquarter close to Juba International Airport.
Already the Council Decision made it clear that EUAVSEC South Sudan would not 
have an executive capacity which limited the impact of the mission once the ethnic 
tensions started. This became obvious when EUAVSEC South Sudan had to be eva-
cuated as a consequence of the outbreak of civil war in December 2013 and could not 
terminate its mandate on the spot as foreseen by the mandate.
Regarding the training impact, the mission was confronted with a lack of will to sup-
port the training activities by the Government of South Sudan and its senior officials 
and also by a proper level of education and training of the personnel to be trained 
thus the mission moved beyond its mandate by providing trainings in areas that 
were originally not foreseen in the mandate, such as public administration and basic 
management training and soft skills. In total, the mission issued more than 600 trai-
ning certificates. Approximately 180 individuals received a basic AVSEC training, 16 
JIA AVSEC staff participated in intermediate AVSEC trainings and around 70 AVSEC 
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officials were trained in specialized courses, such as screening of individuals and 
vehicles. Although steps towards a higher degree of sustainability and inclusion 
were taken, the number of adequately trained personnel remained limited.
When the civil war broke out in December 2013, the mission had to be evacuated and 
no extension of the mandate could be agreed. 
Conclusion
The case study of EUAVSEC South Sudan has shown that it was the very first type of a 
technical assistance mission in the framework of CSDP. It also demonstrated that the 
EU and its member states simply wanted to have a stake in this new-born country, 
having only limited ambitions and political will to go for a real CSDP mission which 
could have had an impact on the overall situation of the country. Thus, also the local 
ownership remained limited. The EU therefore missed a chance in having a deci-
sive stake in South Sudan by not translating its comprehensive approach for South 
Sudan into a more concrete CSDP action.
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The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya - Strategic 
Shortcomings and Lessons Identified
Gitte Højstrup Christensen, Royal Danish Defence College 
The EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM), with the objective of suppor-
ting Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s 
borders, was launched in May 2013 but suspended during the summer of 2014, 
because the security situation in Libya deteriorated. Therefore, the mission’s contri-
bution was, for most parts, limited. But why did the EU Assistance Mission fail, and 
what, if anything, could have been done differently? In hindsight there are impor-
tant lessons to be learned from the mission’s strategic shortcomings. This chapter 
provides a summary of the IECEU project’s assessment of the EU Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission, EUBAM Libya, and its contribution to the 
country’s overall security situation12. It takes departure in the complete deliverables 
of the Work Package 3, with The Libyan Review13 as the main source of reference. 
The aim of this chapter is to outline the mission’s most significant strategic shortco-
mings and lessons identified, which are important in improving the effectiveness of 
the capabilities in EU conflict prevention.
Introduction
In the beginning of the 2011 Libya revolution, there were promising signs of a transi-
tion towards democracy. However, due to the country’s long history of “institutiona-
lized statelessness”14 and division between three self-governing provinces with little 
contact to one another, this transition encountered severe challenges early on. This 
un-institutionalized character of the country had led to a system in which all power 
was concentrated at the top and lacked cohesion at all levels of governance.15 This 
factor had allowed Colonel Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi to rule, but it also made the Libyan 
state volatile. Therefore, when al-Qadhafi, the leader of Libya since 1969, was remo-
ved from power by revolutionaries aided by an international (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization) intervention based on Resolution 197316, Libya lost its only stabilizing 
component and the country descended into chaos. The security apparatus collapsed 
and a power vacuum was created which provided fertile ground for different inte-
rests and groups – some of which were armed. This escalated into violent conflict, 
uncontrolled weapons flows and attacks by Islamist extremist groups.17  
It soon became clear to the International Community that the situation in Libya was 
escalating out of control. The conflict began to spill over into neighboring states, 
which were likewise of great concern to the EU.18 Therefore, in May 2013 EUBAM 
12) IECEU deliverables: http://www.ieceu­project.com/?page_id=197
13) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review. http://www.ieceu­project.com/wp­content/uploads/2017/05/IECEU_
D3.4_Libya_review.pdf
14) Rosan Smits, Floor Janssen, Ivan Briscoe and Terri Breswick, ”Revolution and its discontents: state 
fractions and violence in the new Libya”. The Cligendael Institute (2013), p 4. https://www.clingendael.
org/publication/revolution­and­its­discontents­state­factions­and­violence­new­libya
15) IECEU D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report. 
16) United Nations “Security Council Approves ‘No­Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary 
Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions”. Press release, 17 March 2011.
17) Smits, et al. ”Revolution and its discontents: state fractions and violence in the new Libya”. The 
Cligendael Institute (2013), p 1.
18) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review.
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Libya was deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy19. The objec tive 
was to provide support for Libyan authorities in improving and developing boar-
der security, however, due to an escalating security situation, the mission had to 
be prematurely withdrawn and subsequently put on hold. This raises the following 
questions: why did the EU Assistance Mission fail, and what, if anything, could 
have been done differently? This article does not consider or include all factors and 
elements needed to answer this question, but highlights the IECEU project’s most 
significant findings in this case. The EUBAM Libya mission failed, and in hindsight, 
there are important strategic lessons to be learnt.  
Strategic shortcomings
In 2013, the EU established EUBAM Libya with the purpose of developing an 
Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy together with the Libyans to sup-
port and train the Libyan border control.20 However, by the time the mission was 
deployed the conflict had escalated further, institutional and political arrangements 
had collapsed and Libya had experienced a fractional takeover. This systemic frag-
mentation was one of the main obstacles to EUBAM Libya, as it prevented the estab-
lishment of systemic affiliation between the mission and Libyan counterparts.21 This 
meant that there was no single Libyan recipient that the mission could partner up 
with, which was a significant drawback, as it prevented strategic planning. This 
left the mission in a catatonic state, partly due to the risk that if “the EU would have 
used its power to push a move by either of the parties in conflict to take a more aggressive 
approach, it would have risked undermining that particular party and perhaps destabilizing 
the situation and even escalating the conflict”.22  
Another major setback for mission planning was timing, as the EU had to wait for 
an invitation, a so-called Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA),23 from the Libyan 
authorities, which was difficult to obtain because there was no single state structure 
in Libya at the time, from which the invitation could be given. This delay influen-
ced the mission’s effectiveness,24 as it lost momentum, whilst the security situation 
deterio rated further. In February 2012 Amnesty International described that 
19) EEAS, COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY EU (2015) “Integrated Border Assistance 
Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)”. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/csdp/missions­and­operations/
eubam­libya/pdf/factsheet_eubam_libya_en.pdf
20) IECEU D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report.
21) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 9.
22) ibid. p. 36.
23) SOMAs are bilateral or multilateral treaties that define the legal position of military forces and civi­
lian personnel deployed by one or more states or by an international organization in the territory of 
an other state with the latter’s consent. See Aurel, Sari ”Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements 
under the ESDP: The EU’s Evolving Practice” The European Journal of International Law Vol. 19 no. 1. 
(2008),  p. 68.  http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/19/1/180.pdf
24) IECEU D3.4. The Libya Review  D3.4. p. 19.
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hundreds of armed militias in Libya were “largely out of control”25. When an invi-
tation finally arrived, from the government of Prime Minister Zidan, the EU rus-
hed to launch the mission, and therefore did not follow the normal procedure for 
constructing an Operation Plan26 (OPLAN).27  CDSP border related missions as stan-
dard require comprehensive assessment, such as evaluation of the country’s present 
border capability, management needs, security, social, and political risks and vulne-
rabilities. This assessment is required to take place before a mission is established.28 
The quick mission launch, and lack of a proper situational assessment, was proble-
matic as some of the political aspects, like the situation in Libyan politics, had chan-
ged since the original plan, and was not properly considered.29 Another essential 
element blocking mission planning, was that in ultimo 2012, the south of Libya was 
declared a military zone, which meant the area was off limits for any international 
mission. This, according to Libyan interviewees, made the whole matter of border 
control insignificant.30
25) Amnesty International “Militias threaten hopes for new Libya” Amnesty International Publications, 
(2012), p. 5. 
https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2016/12/libya_i_report_i_militias_threaten_hopes_for_new_
libya_­_no_pic.pdf ?x65391
26) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 34.
27) The Council of the European Union “Revised draft EU Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border 
Management” Doc. No. 16044/2/13, Rev. 2. (2013).
28) The Council of the European Union “Revised draft EU Concept on CSDP Support to Integrated Border 
Management” Doc. No. 16044/2/13, Rev. 2. (2013).
29) IECEU D3.5 Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central Africa Republic, p. 147.
30) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 33.
Members of the IECEU project on a field visit to Afghanistan
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For further reading:
D3.4 The Libya review. 2016. IECEU, 653371. 
D3.5 Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central Africa 
Republic. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D3.7 Africa: Conclusion Report. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
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When evaluating the mission, it is fair to argue that the EU’s level of ambition level 
was disproportionate to the challenge at hand. As EUBAM Libya’s task was to build 
government capacity in terms of border control, it fell directly into a minefield of 
fractional elites pulling and pushing in different directions, all with the interest of 
using the mission for their own advantage.31 Due to these circumstances, The Libyan 
Review argues that: ”in hindsight, simply looking analytically at the situation at the start 
of the EUBAM mission, the mission was doomed, at least in terms of achieving its ambi­
tious, strategic level mandate”.32  Furthermore, it is argued that: “state­building and other 
large sale development missions should have taken place in tandem”.33  This implies that 
the mission’s goal was off from the beginning, and focus should have been direc-
ted elsewhere. Following this line of thought, it can be argued that the EU strategy 
might have had more success if it had focused its assistance on establishing fora and 
structures addressing Libya’s internal conflicts, rather than focusing on construc-
ting systems against external threats, based on the false idea of a Libyan state. 34, 35
Too little too late
There are multiple lessons to be learned from the failure of EUBAM Libya mission. 
These are “primarily related to the strategic level thinking and planning structures of the 
EU. It is not hindsight to argue, that the EUBAM Libya was a mission that was timed and 
placed wrongly, and that the errors that led to this were not unavoidable.”36 Conclusively, 
The Libyan Review argued that if improvement is to be made, more emphasis must 
be put on careful and thorough strategic planning, by first and foremost inclu-
ding a comprehensive assessment of the context to which a mission is deployed.37 
This chapter pinpoints three major strategic shortcomings, which had significant 
influence on the failure of EUBAM Libya: (1) not appreciating the complex nature 
of the “state” in Libya - problems could have been better anticipated by looking at 
history to understand Libya’s institutionalized statelessness; (2) excessive ambi-
tions on part of the EU, and too little action when required - the mandate was overly 
optimistic and should have been downscaled to improve effectiveness; and (3) reality 
was against the mission - by the time of EUBAM’s evacuation, conducting a civilian 
crisis management operation in Libya was beyond the political capabilities of the 
EU.38
31) Smits, et al, ”Revolution and its discontents: state fractions and violence in the new Libya”. The 
Cligendael Institute, (2013), p 5.
32) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 23.
33) Ibid p. 10.
34) Lacher, Wolfram (Ed.) “Fault lines of the revolution: political actors, camps and conflicts in the new 
Libya” Berlin, SSOAR (2013), p. 35. http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/38566/sso­
ar­2013­lacher­Fault_lines_of_the_revolution.pdf ?sequence=1
35) IECEU D3.4 The Libya Review, p. 29.
36) ibid. p. 50.
37) ibid.
38) IECEU D3.6 Discussion Report on Libya, South Sudan, CAR and DR Congo.
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Case Studies in Afghanistan and occupied Palestinian 
Territories
The Work Package 4 (WP4) of the IECEU project covered the case studies of the 
European Union’s CSDP engagement in the Middle East and Asia, in the occupied 
Palestinian territories (OPT) and Afghanistan. The five reports of WP4 have covered 
desk reviews on previous literature (D4.1 and D4.2), a study report on the findings of 
the IECEU field research concerning the six capabilities influencing the effectiveness 
of EU crisis prevention (D4.3) and a discussion report describing the two roundtable 
events, organised by the Crisis Management Centre and the National University of 
Ireland Maynooth (D4.4). The deliverable D4.5 draws together the above-mentioned 
reports and presents the main conclusions of the IECEU case studies on the OPTs 
and Afghanistan. It provides an outline on the current status of security sector 
reform and the related criminal justice sector reform in the two places, as well as of 
the main elements of EU engagements in these areas. The report also includes some 
recommendations on how the EU engagement in these two conflict contexts can be 
improved.39 This chapter concentrates on the effectiveness of the EU’s missions in 
Afghanistan and suggest recommendations to enhance the EU’s impact.
IECEU study findings in Afghanistan
Kieran Doyle, NUIM - Kennedy Institute & Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS
The EU has had a Special Representative (EUSR) in Kabul since 2002.  Its mission is 
to assist in stabilising the country. In 2007 the EU started the Afghanistan police 
mission (EUPOL) under the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) and Comprehensive 
Approach of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).  EUPOL Afghanistan 
will finish in December 2016. Initially, there were difficulties with co-ordination 
between EUSR and EUPOL. Both missions, in contrast to the US contribution, are 
small and for the most part geographically restricted to the capital. The effectiveness 
or otherwise of an EU police mission in a developing nation suffering an ideology- 
based threat like Islamic State, is in many ways a microcosm of the political turmoil 
in Europe. Deeds that bring about stability need to replace words that excuse insta-
bility. The stage has passed where member states can view a mission as symbolic. 
This is no longer enough.  A mission has to be practical. Meaningful tangibles are 
needed.
39) The paper is based on earlier WP4 deliverables on Afghanistan. D4.2 IECEU Afghanistan review. 
2016. IECEU, 653371. D4.3 IECEU Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. 
2016. IECEU, 653371. D4.4 Discussion Report on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. 
2016. IECEU, 653371. D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report. 2016. IECEU, 653371. The deliverable 
D4.1 Palestinian Territories Reviews touches solely on OTP.
The IECEU study provides 25 recommendations for a way forward. Where issues 
have been identified a corresponding solution is offered. The majority relate to EU 
bodies like the CPCC and PSC responsible for setting up and managing a police mis-
sion. Two key questions underpin the recommendations and a ‘way forward’. 1) Is the 
current EU setup in Brussels - policy, institutions and civilian policing approach – 
capable of increasing the stability of a nation experiencing an irregular war through 
a police-building mission if it excludes security? And if not, what measures needs 
to be implemented to make it fit the purpose? 2) How did EUPOL contribute to the 
EU’s goal of increasing the stability in Afghanistan? In other words, can a mission 
that leaves a nation, in a less safe state, than when it arrived, be deemed a success? 
The recommendations that follow are all interlinked, without this being spelt out 
in WP4 deliverables. They contribute toward a unified approach that includes secu-
rity and everything this means for a police mission, from planning and strategy to 
implementation and activities.    
Since 2002 the international community has been engaged in SSR efforts  in 
Afghanistan. The overarching aim was to achieve a rule of law approach as the basis 
of increasing security and stability. This desired end state has not been attained. 
Fifteen years later, and after enormous investment,  Afghanistan is still blighted 
by violence. It remains highly unstable part of the world where the military, not 
the police, continue to lead on the security front. While most nations and coali-
tions, such as the EU, that were part of these efforts can rightly claim success for 
the individual programme or mission they implemented, such claims ring hollow 
for Afghans. The migrant crisis today that fuels political discontent across Europe 
is a consequence of the international community’s inability to stabilise places like 
Afghanistan. An effective rule of law approach in an armed conflict environment 
means a robust police model to lead a security effort that the military can support. 
As it stands, identifying and branding a police model to cater for this reality is an 
urgent challenge the EU needs to address.
For further reading:
D4.2 IECEU Afghanistan review. 2016. IECEU, 653371. 
D4.3 IECEU Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and 
Afghanistan. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.4 Discussion Report on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and 
Afghanistan. 2016. IECEU, 653371. 
D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
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The EUBAM Rafah mission was launched in 2005 and it had its origins in the AMA 
agreement, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) 
concerning the reopening of the border crossing point in Rafah, which the EU was 
asked to monitor in addition to building the capacity of the PA’s border manage-
ment. Since 2007 the mission has not been able to execute its mandate, but on a very 
limited extent and the office of the mission in Gaza is manned by local staff, while 
the mission’s international members are visiting Gaza approximately only once in a 
month. The emphasis of the mission is currently in supporting the PA administra-
tion on matters related to borders and crossings.
Strategic shortcomings and lessons identified
There are three thematic aspects that were raised as paramount in the analysis 
conducted on the missions: Respect for local ownership (1), democratic norms 
and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, 
and where applicable, international humanitarian law (2) and coherence with 
other areas of EU external action (3). These aspects are now further elaborated for 
further discussion.
Respect for local ownership
Based on the interviews conducted in the research, it appears that the EU CSDP sup-
port to the Palestinian SSR is based on a narrow understanding of local ownership, 
which is surprising, when considering the universal acceptance of the concept and 
the thinking behind it. This raises the question whether the role of the concept is dif-
ferent on a rhetorical level and on the operational, mission, level. Local ownership, 
like any other political concept, whether normative or not, is continuously con-
tested and open to different political interpretation and maneuvers. For a normative 
concept, these contestations carry an added political weight. 
The lack of executing the principle of local ownership may result from simple lack 
of experience and knowledge on how to reach out and act with non-state actors. The 
research points out that for example community policing, a current support focus 
area of EUPOL COPPS, is simply viewed very differently amongst the international 
experts of the mission. It is also a fact that inclusiveness, which is an integral ele-
ment in the local ownership, is time consuming and would require the mission to 
develop a thorough and better understanding of local context. This would require 
mapping out actors and maintaining contacts, thus multiplying the number of local 
contacts held by the mission. A next step from establishing a more thorough con-
tact network would also be a deeper analytical approach to new and existing sources 
of information. Both of the above mentioned points of development are, however, 
difficult to reach, if the mission members do not have the required cultural unders-
tanding. It is important to note that the Palestinian respondents in this research 
assessed that the overall the mission members had poor knowledge and understan-
ding of the Palestinian history, society and politics as well as the impact of the long 
IECEU Case study in Palestine Territories: lessons identified
Jyrki Ruohomäki (Dr.), CMC Finland
Foreword
The research conducted for the IECEU project at CMC Finland by Dr. Leena Avonius 
concerning the effectiveness of the EU in the Middle East, focused on the two EU 
missions, the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL 
COPPS) and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM Rafah). For 
her work, Dr. Avonius conducted e.g. a desk study and a field trip to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (OPT). This short chapter is a compilation of this previous 
work done by Dr. Avonius in separate deliverables, but the final responsibility of the 
interpretations presented here lies with the author.
EU in the Occupied Palestine Territories 
The research done in the IECEU project concerning the OPT’s focused on the EU sup-
port to the Palestinian security sector reform and the related criminal justice reform. 
The EU started its engagement in Palestine already after the Oslo Accords in the 
1990’s, but the second intifada in 2000 forced the EU to put its SSR (Security Sector 
Reform) support on hold. The EU returned in 2005 with the two above mentioned 
missions. In addition to these missions, the EU’s support has also included financial 
support to the security sector officials in OPT’s, which has added compre hensiveness 
to the EU’s approach, but also raised the demands of coordination and coherence. In 
terms of the size of donors, the EU has been the largest in the Palestinian territories.
The EU involvement is focused on the SSR process. Its main impact, broadly 
speaking, has been the improvement of the PA’s security sector in terms of it being 
now better equipped and skilled. The overall picture of the progress in the security 
sector is, however, much more complicated. The intra-Palestinian division has also 
led to diversification of development and effectiveness in the security and justice 
reforms in the PA-led West Bank and the Hamas-led Gaza. Also, in general terms, the 
hindrance that the Israeli occupation continues to have on the Palestinian security 
and justice sector has to be taken into consideration when making an overall assess-
ment on the situation. 
The EUPOL COPPS mission started its work on the 1st of January 2006. It was 
grounded upon the UK police assistance mission, which was launched already in 
2003. EUPOL COPPS follows a so called programmatic approach, which means that 
the mission carries out a high number and a wide range of activities to implement 
the objectives defined in the mission documents, such as OPLAN. Currently the mis-
sion has expanded its tasks from the police sector to the justice sector, and is advi-
sing Palestinian justice sector actors in matters related to criminal justice.
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conflict. This is most definitely partly due to the short rotational cycle that the inter-
national experts follow. As the knowledge base of an individual has accumulated, 
her one year deployment might be over. This aspect of the research therefore raises 
several points to consider, varying from rotational aspects to training in terms of 
improvement of the cultural awareness and the so called soft skills of the mission 
members.
Democratic norms and internationally accepted human rights principles and the rule of law, 
and where applicable, international humanitarian law
This aspect connects to the wider political and academic discussion, which critiques 
the ’security first’ approach. This approach tends to intentionally and unintentio-
nally depoliticise the conflict and frame the security matters as technical, neglec-
ting to connect to the fundamentals of the conflict. As noted in many case studies, 
unhelpful depoliticisation can build structures that actually cement the conflict and 
sustain it, in contrast to breaking it down. This happens, when the depoliticising, 
technical approach neglects addressing the societal, cultural, economic and politi-
cal root causes of the conflict, failing to mediate the conflicting narratives that lay 
the foundations for the conflict. In reference, in the interviews it was noted that the 
EU should apply a broader, comprehensive but agile view, instead of being locked on 
surface level of constitutional, state-building two state approach.
In connection to this aspect it is also important to note the room of improvement in 
terms of information sharing. The study notes a non-existence of reports and publi-
cation by the two EU missions. This leaves the Palestinian, as well the international, 
audience unaware of what the mission has accomplished and/or what they are trying 
to accomplish. The mission, however, does use multiple methods to make European 
laws, policies and practices available for the Palestinian beneficiaries, by providing 
them actual documents or organizing study trips to European countries and con-
ducting trainings. In terms of human rights and gender elements in the mission, it 
seems that progress on the streamlining has to be made. Human rights and gender 
experts are customarily commenting the planning documents only on the last phase 
of planning, which is typically not a very mainstreamed and effective way.
Coherence with other areas of EU external action
As there are several EU actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the compre-
hensiveness and coherence is highly important. In addition to the two missions 
analyzed in the project, there are two offices of EU’s political representative (EUREP, 
UNRWA), an office of EU Special Representative, and the EU delegation to Israel.  This 
multitude seems to create a situation in which the borderlines of the missions are 
becoming less clear. Some respondents argued that the change of the CSDP instru-
ments towards a more development side is not the right direction to go and that the 
missions should limit their activities to immediate response, such as monitoring 
ceasefire or peace accords and providing material assistance. Stepping into develop-
ment work with unexperienced staff and without such capacities would be counter-
productive. If the missions seem to need areas of extensions, perhaps it would be 
necessary to address the question of a possible exit.
For further reading:
D4.1 Palestinian Territories Review. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. 
2017. IECEU, 653371.
D4.4 Discussion Report on the Occupied Palestinian Territories and 
Afghanistan. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
D4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
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5. COMPARING APPLES 
AND AIRPLANES:
CASE STUDY ANALYSIS IN IECEU
Maria Mekri, SaferGlobe
Foreword
Comparative analysis of crisis management operations and missions is complicated 
but possible. Understanding broader trends, strengths and challenges requires com-
parative analysis, especially as there are large variations in crisis management. The 
IECEU –project used a conceptual framework, which was the basis for comparative 
analysis of 8 case studies. In very general terms, it can be said that the strengths of 
EU crisis management lie in expertise and ability to cooperate and coordinate with a 
number of actors. On-going development is needed in strategic planning. 
IECEU study
Comparative analysis of crisis management operations and missions is extremely 
rare but also increasingly important as it lays the foundation for understanding 
broad trends, strengths, and challenges in crisis management. The challenges 
of conducting even one case study in the field are often nearly insurmountable. 
Documentation may be inaccessible, confidential, secret or non-existent; the chan-
ges in security situation may limit physical movement and access to potential 
interviewees, and previous contextual knowledge is needed to understand how the 
research should be best conducted. For multiple case studies, these challenges are 
expounded, making comparative study of crisis management challenging but not 
impossible. 
To create sufficient material for comparative research requires not only several case 
studies but also a mechanism to reconcile and integrate the enormous variation 
within crisis management operations and missions. Early in the IECEU –project, 
we quipped that comparing missions and operations was like “comparing apples 
and airplanes” but only in conducting the research did we understand how true the 
original sentiment was. Missions and operations diverge significantly regarding 
the number of personnel, their skillset, the purpose and mandate of the mission, 
the budget available, the geographical area of operation, the security situation, the 
length of the operation and so forth. As much of the EUs crisis management muster 
is focused on EULEX, the results of a comparative study are also easily skewed to 
reflect the bias. 
The mechanism or conceptual framework needed to be both sufficiently flexible to 
be applicable in different contexts, and sufficiently rigid for comparative analysis. 
The conceptual framework created is built like a wall of blocks. Each block con-
sisted of a focus (one of the six capabilities chosen for IECEU), a perspective (EU or 
NON-EU) and a level of analysis (Field-Operational or Politico-Strategic), and had 
some predetermined thematic questions to guide the researchers. No one case study 
was expected to fill all the blocks,  but with the 10 case studies analyzed in the IECEU, 
there was enough overlapping material for a comparative study whatever challenges 
would be encountered in carrying out the case studies. 
In the analysis of the case studies, we found 56 potentials for increasing the effec-
tiveness of EU crisis management, many of which mirror already on-going policy 
development within the EU. We also found that the variability that we had foreseen 
was even greater than we had expected and extended to the capabilities of each of 
the missions and operations. The variability necessitates nuanced conclusions as 
any overly generalized statements are unlikely to be valid. For example, the crisis 
manage ment operations and missions have extremely capable personnel—but also 
some large challenges in recruitment and human resource functions. Some missions 
and operations were very well equipped, and others had considerable problems with 
sourcing. 
However, some generalised points can be made. In terms of strengths, EU’s crisis 
management still relies on the original corner stones of EU crisis management; the 
expertise of its personnel and EU’s ability to collaborate and cooperate broadly with 
different actors including other EU personnel (the integrated approach). The main 
challenge is reconciling planning with complexity. Getting the pieces of a crisis 
management puzzle together from structures, budgets, agreements, personnel so 
that the mission or operation can be launched is already complicated and time-con-
suming; but the crisis management operations also operate in complex situations 
where change can be rapid, and inbuilt flexibility is required. In these changing 
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6. LEARNING APPLICATION TO 
SUPPORT EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
TRAINING
Markko Kallonen, Petteri Taitto, Kirsi Hyttinen and Pasi Hario, Laurea UAS
Foreword
IECEU Learning Application is one final online production of IECEU to be benefitted 
by training and education communities. EU CSDP related Learning Application is 
available for public, free of charge, on: www.ieceulearning.eu. NMLA can act as a 
stand-alone course to ensure that personnel possesses knowledge about EU crisis 
management, conflict prevention and peacebuilding in general as well as more 
deepen knowledge and experiences related to IECEU Case Studies (Kosovo, BiH, 
DR Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Afghanistan, occupied 
Palestinian Territories). The overall learning aim of the application is that after 
completing the lessons, the user has obtained a basic understanding of the EU 
processes and institutions that are involved in planning and implementing EU’s 
Common Security and Defence Policy missions. Additionally, the user will gain 
understanding of the essential concepts and topics related to crisis prevention and 
crisis management including: comprehensive security, security sector reform (SSR), 
mentoring, monitoring and advising (MMA) and local ownership.
One of the goals of the IECEU project was to provide new solutions, approaches 
and recommendations for the EU to guarantee long-term stability through conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding. New Media based Learning Application (NMLA) was 
circumstances, on-going planning processes are especially vital to differentiate the 
strategic from the expedient.  
European Union´s crisis management is a unique and valuable tool, which has the 
potential to transform conflicts and positively impact the lives of countless civilians. 
Through improving the security situation in Europe’s neighborhood, crisis manage-
ment also contributes to improving Europe’s own security. However, on-going deve-
lopment of crisis management is also needed to tackle the challenges of the future 
better. 
Picture 1. The Conceptual Framework of IECEU
 For further reading: 
D1.5 Conceptual Framework. 2015. IECEU, 653371.    
D5.1 The Effectiveness of EU capabilities and the Current Situation in Pooling 
and Sharing. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D7.1 The improvement of the effectiveness of EU capabilities. 2017. IECEU, 
653371.
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developed to enhance learning in EU crisis management and conflict prevention 
and to provide a catalogue of best practices and lessons learned in EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. The NMLA is an eLearning tool and 
a part of the IECEU training toolbox, developed during the course of the project, as 
a part of the IECEU dissemination activities.40 . The NMLA’s target groups includes 
staff seconded and contracted to the CSDP missions, national staff, researchers, edu-
cational institutions, students, civil servants and employees of NGOs. Training and 
education institutions, operational actors such as CSDP missions, EU delegations as 
well as policy makers can benefit from the learning application by using it to leve-
rage knowledge gaps prior to the residential training event.  
Design of IECEU Learning Application environment
To construct the NMLA, reports from 12 different CSDP operations and more than 
250 interviews were analysed. The best practices and lessons learned through these 
interviews were then developed into an online application, namely the NMLA. 
During the analysing process, the qualitative analyses pointed out that experts 
experienced positively the rich media contents, especially visualisations and video 
animations. The positive implications were addressed on successful descriptions of 
the challenging and culturally sensitive topics of peacebuilding.41 In the group dis-
cussions it was observed that the content of peacebuilding training material must 
be updated and changes must be completed to the application in line with the global 
situation. It was addressed that research could contribute to online training with 
providing new knowledge and updated content. NMLA enabled learning taking 
place by adapting knowledge via different methods such as reading, watching, and 
hearing. There was also a possibility to use learners’ earlier experiences and kno-
wledge and combine them with NMLA content.42
As the information in the field of civilian crisis management develops in a fast pace, 
an interface was designed and implemented for entering new and updating exis-
ting information. The IECEU research findings highlighted the need for enhanced 
training among CSDP mission participants. This need created a strong incentive to 
develop and utilize eLearning in a more systematic manner. In order to support EU’s 
comprehensive approach, it is logical and beneficial to restructure eLearning activi-
ties/platforms in a more holistic manner. 
40) Kirsi, Hyttinen, 2017, Human­Centered design model in the development of learning environments 
for peacebuilding training, case IECEU, New Media Based Learning Application (NMLA). Unpublished.
41) Ibid.
42) Ibid.
Furthermore, the use of various eLearning solutions has increased conside-
rably in EU countries as part of informal and formal education. Also, the EU has 
demonstrated increasing interest towards eLearning and that has resulted in 
investments for developing various eLearning contents to support conflict preven-
tion/crisis management related training (especially under ESDC, ENTRi and EUPST 
activities). The NMLA is based on current EU/CSDP training in particular with 
regard to existing eLearning. Nowadays, the professionals joining the CSDP mis-
sions and operations are more accustomed to use eLearning tools in their training 
and thus they can be more respondent to it. Training that provides understanding 
of this interconnectedness with the various eLearning platforms serves to enhance 
the competences and analytical skills of the collaborators in the CSDP missions and 
operations. Ultimately, this will enhance the effectiveness of the EU’s efforts in con-
flict prevention. NMLA was developed in five phases: 1) analysis of required specifi-
cations 2) developing and coding the platform 3) initial testing of the product 4) pilo-
ting of the platform and 5) revising the final structure and learning objectives. The 
special attention in the development of online training and education in the field of 
crisis management and conflict prevention was addressed towards human centered 
approach and end user feedback throughout the design process. The final evaluation 
of the NMLA will ensure the analysis on how this online training can benefit the 
crisis management experts and dissemination of IECEU –project findings as a tool. 
NMLA’s structure and learning outcomes
The structure of the NMLA consists of ten lessons. The platform allows users to navi-
gate freely, so that they are able to focus on their individual needs and interests. The 
NMLA is facilitated in Opigno Drupal open-source software which provides a clear 
and light basis for comprehensive content which is easy to maintain and update. 
The application can be shared to different communities and thus it suits better the 
future training needs in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Special attention 
was focused on the user-friendly format of the information, so that the users of 
the learning application will be able to utilize the information more easily. The rich 
visua lisation and gamified content give the possibility for enhanced learning oppor-
tunities for the learners.
The learning application is an evolving tool which was developed during the IECEU 
project and can be further developed to meet the constantly changing needs of 
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conflict prevention and crisis management. Laurea UAS together with CEP has and 
will arrange the education for trainers, in order to ensure the future use of the NMLA 
in higher education programmes, training, seminars and workshops. The mainte-
nance and sustainability of the NMLA will be considered as Laurea UAS edits, upda-
tes, supervises and continues the use of the platform, even after the project, to sup-
port the universities and other training organisations in conflict prevention issues.
 
For further reading:
D5.3 Design and Development Processes of the NMLA. 2016. IECEU, 653371.
The New Media based Learning Application at www.ieceulearning.eu.
References:
Hyttinen, Kirsi, 2017, Human-Centered design model in the development of 
learning environments for peacebuilding training, case IECEU, New Media 
Based Learning Application (NMLA). Unpublished.
Kallonen, Markko  and Boštjančič Pulko, Ivana, 2017, Development of IECEU 
E-learning Platform and its Integration into Crisis Management Training, 
EDULEARN17 Proceedings.
IECEU Learning Application includes number of rich visual and gamified learning contents. 
7. INTEROPERABILITY – 
WHAT EFFECTS TO EFFECTIVENESS 
OF EU EXTERNAL ACTIONS?
Elisa Norvanto, Laurea UAS
Foreword
The objectives of this task are driven by the need to assess the potential for poo-
ling and sharing the EU capabilities, in terms of future threats and challenges. The 
research of interoperability and pooling & sharing in IECEU was conducted by seve-
ral IECEU partner organisations, such as AIES, Enquirya, FINCENT, CMC Finland 
byond the others. This paper is based on reseach activities and findings of IECEU. 
The assessment of the potential for pooling and sharing will also evaluate the critical 
points of the current capabilities, overlap between civilian and military efforts and 
the possible interoperability of resources. The focus of this paper is to outline how 
interoperability between EU civilian and military capabilities could be enhanced.
Interoperability
The integrated approach to conflicts and crises aims to consolidate the coherence 
and impact of the EU response to instability and to operationalize the comprehen-
sive approach. Involving many actors in crisis-management efforts requires exter-
nal and internal coordination of crisis management units, instruments and the 
coherence of common objectives. It entails a long-term and holistic approach to 
cross-cutting policy issues of international crisis management, with emphasis on 
output-oriented goals. In line with the principles contained in the various comp-
rehensive approach framework and policy documents, an integrated approach 
to conflicts aims to create synergies at the four levels; multi-dimensional, multi- 
phased, multi-level, multilateral, in order to improve information sharing, contri-
bute to a shared understanding and strategic vision, reduce compartmentalization, 
facilitate inter-agency delivery – all this for a greater impact. To achieve these obje-
ctives, it requires both an enhancement of the civil-military interface and a higher 
degree of interoperability within the EU and between its partners.43 
The new security political threats are more complex, dynamic, interrelated and each 
conflict/region calls for a combined and tailor-made response as also describ ed 
by the integrated approach of the EU. Such an approach requires even more focus 
and attention for interoperability, more efficient civil-military cooperation and 
harmonization and standards. There is now the potential of renewed political will 
to in crease interoperability as evidenced in the vision of ’integrated CSDP crisis 
manage ment operations’ in the 2016 Global Strategy,  stronger emphasis on the 
internal-external security nexus, and an increased focus on EUs neighborhood as 
well as growing security concerns. 
Interest in, and development of, interoperability has been a central focus of the 
European Union from its inception, as from an interoperability point of view, the 
institutional framework of the CSDP crisis management operations is challen-
ging, as all 28 member states44, the European Commission, the Council General 
Secretariat, and the European Parliament (as budgetary authority) have their role 
to play. The impact of this complex decision making matric varies between civilian 
missions and military operations. For the EU external actions, the aim of interopera-
bility is to enhance effectiveness of its capabilities to achieve greater impact through 
more efficient use of available resources and policies. Consequently, interoperability 
of EU crisis management capabilities relies on systems being able to both provide 
and accept services, units, tools and personnel, is the foundation of cooperation 
and pooling and sharing within crisis management. Poor interoperability or lack 
of interoperability leads to inefficiency, wasted resources and at the very worst, in -
ability to act. There are several on-going processes and initiative within EU to in -
crease interoperability, and as stated in the Commission Press release in June 2017 
“already more has been achieved in the area of defense in the last two years than 
it has in the last sixty45.“ Strengthening interoperability is vital also within the 
civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis mana-
gement operations and an even more complicated security environment in the 
European neighborhood. Consequently, the measures to foster the collaboration 
43) European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the 
European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.
44) If the UK is included.
45) European Commission. 2017. A Europe that defends: Commission opens debate on moving towards a 
security and defence union. Brussels, 7 June 2017.
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and coordination, integration, and pooling of resources across the institutions and 
organizations, becomes key for the EU to truly move the comprehensive approach 
forward.46 
Results from the comparative study
Interoperability and enhanced collaboration and coherence within the different 
policies and instruments, are both central for the development future of CSDP 
and European external actions. The comparative study of eight CSDP missions and 
operations conducted during 2015 – 201747 demonstrated that, although the EU has 
developed policies and mechanisms to enhance the coherence of its different foreign 
policy instruments, there is still a need for EU to further develop measures to better 
coordinate its various entities and policies in the field of security and development. 
In relation to the degree of interoperability between the different civilian instru-
ments, the study suggested that there is a large variety among the missions, which 
leads to a varied need of interoperability and challenges. For the military-military 
interoperability, it does not come as a surprise that the role of NATO is playing the 
key role, together with the lack of consensus regarding the development of EU defe-
nce integration. From the effectiveness point of view, the findings related to civil-mi-
litary interoperability48, as well as the potential for the further synergies between the 
civilian and military functions, were the most interesting ones, and consequently 
are further elaborated in this paper.
Civil-military interoperability – challenges and opportunities
The rationale for focusing the study on civil-military aspects of CSDP lies in partly 
the changing security landscape in which CSDP missions and operations are (to be) 
deployed, requiring an increasing the need for more integrated civil-military crisis 
management operations. Terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber security, energy security 
and organized crime are just some of the complex modern threats that require for 
multidimensional approach. Military operations could benefit from a stronger civi-
lian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.), 
building the dialogue with civil society and the access to funding instruments for 
capacity building projects and development, to list just some of the reasons. The 
cooperative civil-military response to new security challenges is also in line with the 
EU comprehensive approach, and integrated approach to conflict and crises which 
46) European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for 
the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.
47) Based on the analysis of 8 case studies, and 265 interviews.
48) Interoperability in this study is analysed through the following dimensions: cooperation/collabora­
tion/coordination within the operation/mission, between the EU actors on the ground, and between the 
CSDP mission/operation and third party, and civ­mil/civ­civ/mil­mil synergies.
further dissolute the traditional borders between civilian and military crisis mana-
gement approaches, and partners. 
So far, the CSDP has been the EU’s tool for external crisis management, encom-
passing military and civilian aspects. The new security challenges, in particular to 
Europe’s East and South, raise the question whether crisis management only should 
continue to be the CSDP’s aim, and in what way the tool could be further developed 
and utilized. It goes without saying, that the added value of EU’s conflict preven-
tion and crisis management approach to external conflicts and crisis in comparison 
to its international partners, such as United Nations and NATO, is embedded in its 
ability to employ the resources of its Members States by combining a variety of dip-
lomatic, economic, development, defense and humanitarian instruments to address 
the external threats. However, due to a number of political, structural, financial, and 
organizational challenges, as well as, short rotation cycles, national caveats, techno-
logical, human and procedural related challenges in information and intelligence 
sharing,  are all among the identified factors influencing the further development of 
the civil-military interoperability. Similarly, although the EU cooperates with many 
actors, third country and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is 
growing emphasis. 
Although the EU is uniquely positioned as a comprehensive security provider, it 
faces the problem of institutional stove-piping and the lack of streamlined deci-
sion-making.  Nevertheless, the Brexit as well as formulation of EU’s Global Strategy 
seem to have created momentum for strengthening the Common Security and 
Defence Policy. The discussion has comprised on how the 27 remaining govern ments 
would share assets and deepen cooperation in EU missions. However, the plan is not 
to establish a European army nor challenge NATO, yet rather to fulfill the ‘gaps’ in 
relation to external actions. The ministers of the countries seek to strengthen the 
EU’s ability to respond autonomously to external threats without a help from United 
States, underlying the potential need for the EU to launch a mission in regions where 
NATO does not consider taking action. The Joint Declaration signed in Warsaw in 
2016, identified 42 areas where EU and NATO will enhance their collaboration. 
Among others, the closer cooperation with NATO will have implications to the 
future development of CSDP. The larger the number of actors, the more clearly 
challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit EU has on inc-
reasing interoperability. Moreover, the more divergent EU practices are, the more 
challenging will cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to pro-
duce desirable outcomes. In addition, the proliferation of the security challenges, 
and the proliferation of the number of different actors, the understanding of inter-
operability need to adapt to this change as well. The widening web of actors involved 
in the crisis management adds amount of challenge to the coordination of the efforts. 
Furthermore, evolving domains such as cyber defence and maritime domain, needs 
also to be taken into consideration in the interoperability related discussions.
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Challenges
The analysis of case studies have shown, that the key strategic- level challenges are 
often related to the information access restrictions, changing political objectives, 
Command and Control (C2), decision-making capabilities, as well as the force struc-
ture requirements. The disparities in technological capabilities, sovereignty con-
cerns, differing national interests, cuts in defence spending are political in nature 
and can only be resolved by politicians at the strategic level. There are limits to what 
extend the nations are willing to trust another. These limits constrain openness and 
system interdependencies (i.e. intelligence, communications) which in turn affects 
interoperability. Nevertheless, these challenges tend to reverberate throughout the 
operational and field levels. Operational and field level interoperability challenges 
are often related to planning, C2, and management namely in terms of information 
exchange and security issues. In addition, challenging for military operations, some 
nations are likely to continue to maintain direct national control of their national 
assets rather than contribute them to a larger, shared pool under direct control of the 
Force Commander. Furthermore, in the field challenges relate often to performance 
capabilities referring to the capability of the humans and technology to operate as 
intended. They may include challenges related to logistics, information sharing; 
command, control and communication (C3); Doctrinal and cultural differences, lan-
guage barriers and resource gaps. Furthermore, sharing of the information in the 
field is seen to be challenging as a result of over classification of information. Also 
change or hand-over of information between the troop rotations and shift changes 
hampers the interoperability. Above all, when political motives are misaligned, no 
amount of interoperability, technological or otherwise, can mitigate the problem.
In addition to the above list of challenges hampering the interoperability, three 
over arching challenges for interoperability can be listed: i) divergent, non-stan-
dardized and sometimes contradictory national practices, which remain evident in 
CSDP operations and missions. ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability 
in practice, especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military 
actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs; iii) the cur-
rent intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some 
of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), 
which affects the development of interoperability.49 
Recommendations
The current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, 
some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU, which hinders the deve-
lopment of interoperability. However, a new dimension to interoperability is both 
the potential of a greater number of integrated missions necessitating a higher level 
of civil-military interoperability as well as the increased need to include civilian 
49) For more information, view D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
components into military operations (generally to add expertise), and military com-
ponents into civilian missions (generally to increase the security of the mission). 
Where military or civilian components are added, the mission/operation becomes 
somewhat integrated while remaining purely military or purely civilian in terms 
of organisation. Larger civilian missions have many of the same requirements as 
military operations. Increased civilian-military cooperation especially in terms of 
supportive functions like procurement, logistics and information sharing would 
not impinge on the divide that needs to exist between the two functions.  
Being able to work together in coherence is however not only an institutional, but 
also a cultural and political question. Coherence between the civilian and military 
actors has been recognized to be an important tool to increase the efficiency of inter-
national conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. Therefore, understan-
ding the key elements enabling and on the other hand, preventing interoperability 
of the EU’s civilian and military crisis management instruments is crucial. It goes 
without saying that the major obstacles for stronger interoperability within the 
Union’s external actions is strongly related to Member States’ political will and com-
mitment towards the development of common security and defence. Nevertheless, 
the cross-case study analysis suggested that there is a number of areas, which could 
help enhancing further civil-military interoperability in CSDP. 
The potentials for enhance civil-military interoperability are listed also here:
1. Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more inte-
grated, structured civilian/military operationalization,
2. Further development/ support centralized/ harmonized pre-mission and 
in-mission training, linked to job descriptions.
3. Discourage national (re)interpretation of the ‘Statement of recruitment’ 
used in CSDP military operations. Aim to harmonize “working” versions of 
key capacity building concepts (e.g. ’Integrated Border Management’)
4. Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible.
5. Aim to harmonize “working” versions of key concepts for development of 
shared understanding.
6. Create mechanisms to create and enforce institutional memory
• Through training 
• Through standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working
• Through creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates 
and hand-over notes
7. Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services.
8. Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to buil-
ding synergies with the existing civilian warehouse.
9. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, 
addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges of CSDP crisis 
management operations.
10. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture 
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11. Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both 
for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with 
NATO structures.
12. Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what 
information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when.
13. Strengthen the EDA’s role in developing cyber defence for CSDP crisis 
manage ment operations and invest in building synergies with NATO.
14. Consider developing a CSDP concept for, so called CNO’s, enhancing the 
common operational picture and interoperability in the field.
15. Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on 
top of existing information sharing tools.
16. Include third country participation in the early planning stage.
17. Strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management opera-
tions by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard 
operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological 
differences/interoperability. 
18. Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build 
synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.
19. Continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research 
and external evaluators
Importance of joint situational awareness and information 
sharing
The broad range and the complexity of CSDP missions make the ability to manage 
information and resources efficiently critical to decision-making, planning, and 
engaging capabilities within such missions, and essential to increase their effi-
ciency, visibility and impact. The many processes, procedures, information manage-
ment systems, and equipment currently in use for such missions need to be identi-
fied, characterized, and modelled to constitute a coherent and interoperable situa-
tional awareness and information exchange capability and operation control center. 
The study showed that there are a number of interoperability-related issues, which 
on one hand have a direct impact on the day-to-day running of the CSDP opera-
tion, and on the other hand, would enhance the development of stronger CSDP 
organizational culture. Hence, in order to address some of the issues effecting the 
cooperation and coordination between the different EU institutions and between 
the EU and third parties, the information and intelligence gathering, managing and 
sharing, third country participation and organizational learning, are among the key 
aspects that are to be addressed by the EU within the coming years. These aspects are 
elaborated further.
1) Need for better mechanisms to collect and share information within the mis-
sion, between the field and Brussels.
Information functions as an enabler of interoperability. The key issue hampering 
effective coordination & collaboration among field missions operating in the same 
geographical regions has been a lack of shared situational awareness, underutilized 
reporting, access to information and analysis on these. Due to number of technical, 
procedural and human related reasons information sharing within the CSDP opera-
tion is seen insufficient in the field and between the Brussels and Field. The lack of 
secured networks, and fragmented information sharing practices significantly ham-
per the information sharing, information management and overall communication 
within the operation, between the different actors in the field, and between the field 
office and OHQ. In the absence of common information sharing culture, adequate 
and compatible tools and systems, lots of valuable information, contacts and intel-
ligence is lost or poorly transferred.  In regards to the interoperability significant 
gaps remain in the realms of information-sharing and communications, styles of 
command, cultural understanding, standard equipment, and complex intelligence 
sharing policies. 
Hence, as the mandates and operational environments of CSDP missions have evol-
ved, their capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze 
information must develop too. The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, 
analyze and discuss reports and other relevant information through an enhanced 
information sharing framework within the CSDP structures and between their 
support elements at both strategic and operational-field level. In order to ensure the 
timely and efficient flow of information within the EU crisis management structu-
res, the information sharing framework should take into account the procedures and 
practices, tools, technological solutions, staffing, capability development means. 
This should be done in active cooperation with field missions to foster interopera-
bility among EU actors and provide a basis for cooperation with external partners.
2) Need for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools
The current capabilities to collect, analyze, store and share CSDP-related intelligence 
is inadequate. The shortfalls range from proper means in terms of services and equip-
ment, skills, staff, procedures, common intelligence policy and intelligence sharing 
culture. There is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and 
legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations. All these domains are strongly 
interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to 
develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a com-
mon operational picture. Furthermore, there is an absence of a common CSDP civi-
lian-military intelligence analysis tool. Currently, the different organizations have 
their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other 
EU missions or institutions.
Therefore, in order to utilize the human aspect properly, more training is necessary. 
Nowadays, there is no common understanding between the EU member states as to 
what information can be shared with whom and a lack of trust mostly due to short 
rotations is clearly visible. EU missions and operations are not able to force a partici-
pating nation to share information and here the problems usually begin. Information 
sharing often happens ad hoc and cannot be documented due to the nature of the 
content, which makes it a very sensitive issue and therefore it was suggested that a 
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doctrine and a common language could be the right steps forward. Additionally, one 
should also be aware that information sharing does not equal intelligence sharing. 
Thus, the second capability mentioned, was a CSDP civil-military intelligence ana-
lysis tool which would clarify how intelligence should be collected and with whom 
it can be shared. 
3) Need for better ways to strengthen third country participation to the plan-
ning and conduct of the mission
The current crisis management procedures do not enable solid third state participa-
tion to the EU CSDP. In theory, third states have same rights and obligations in terms 
of day-to-day management of the operation as the EU member states. However, any 
contribution of third states is without prejudice to the decision making autonomy 
of the Union. In addition, one key aspect which effects on the use of third-nations’ 
capabilities is that they are not officially involved in the drafting of the concept of 
operations or the operation plan nor do they participate in force generation confe-
rences. They are invited to contribute – in most cases to fill gaps – but are required 
to accept the EU’s timeline and procedures. Even once the operation is launched, the 
various mechanisms in place limits the involvement of partners, effectively redu-
cing them to second-class stakeholders. Furthermore, lack of institutionalization 
of third state contributions in EU crisis management may hamper the information 
sharing within the mission and operation. National caveats may limit the possibility 
to release documents within the CSDP, as some of the information can be circulated 
only among the EU member states.
In order to strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management ope-
rations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard ope-
rating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/
interoperability. Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and 
better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important 
as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy. 
4) Need for better mechanisms to support organizational learning
The utilization of lessons identified from the past or on-going missions/operations 
in the planning and conduct of the CSDP operations/missions are not monitored. 
Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the 
current challenge to the EEAS is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at 
appropriate levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP 
operations and missions has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct 
lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to 
ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities 
should be strengthened.
Thus, EEAS should continue development of a shared platform for lessons identi-
fied as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management 
operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation 
process. This can be strengthened by continue sharing the information with external 
parties conducting research and external evaluations. The cooperation between the 
EEAS and Commission should also be fostered.
Way forward
Interoperability challenges affect the efficiency and effectiveness of current crisis 
management operations. These interoperability challenges are likely to become 
even greater in the near future due to new security environment, closer civil-military 
cooperation, greater participation of 3rd states and future integrated/hybrid/joint 
missions. Moreover, in terms of efficiency, EUs military operations can benefit from 
a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civi-
lian policing, etc.) and building the dialogue with civil society. Civilian missions can 
also benefit from closer integration with military elements through, for example, 
provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning. Integration can thus support 
both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives as well as strengthen 
pooling and sharing. 
The current developments including the establishment of Military Planning and 
Command Capability, PRISM50, EU Defence Research Fund, are warmly welcome as 
they address many of the above-mentioned issues hampering further civil-military 
synergies. Furthermore, EUFOR ALTHEA as well as the EU Satellite Centre can be 
regarded as good examples of interoperability and it should be acknowledged that a 
lot has already been done in this field. Another remarkable advancement regarding 
the greater interoperability and pooling and sharing, is related to ongoing discus-
sion on the future of ATHENA51  mechanism. Funding of equipment, and EU military 
missions/ operations have been identified to be the key issue hampering the further 
synergies between the civilian and military sides. Hence renewed funding instru-
ment may bring solution to some of the funding related challenges. Furthermore, 
the following three elements; (1) The EU Global Strategy’s Implementation Plan on 
security and defence; (2) The European Defence Action Plan, and (3) Cooperation 
with NATO, are expected to help the European Union to deliver more effectively 
on the strategic priorities identified in the EU Global Strategy, namely to protect 
Europe and its citizens, respond to crises and build our partners’ capacities. Work 
on all three strands has progressed at a fast pace in recent months, and they have 
implications also to the quest of interoperability. Other positive developments are 
also taking place such as, mission support platform and the common warehouse ini-
tiative. By centralizing assets that are used in missions, there are greater economies 
50) A common platform to enhance the further integration of EU Conflict Prevention, Peace building and 
Mediation activities.
51) European Union mechanism to manage the funding of the common costs of EU operations having 
military or defence implications.
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of scale, and speed for both deployment and liquidation of missions can be signi-
ficantly enhanced. The centralization creates a common rulebook, this time about 
the equipment and services needed for a crisis management operation. It establishes 
a de facto standard that ideally is again linked to the training system and national 
states. On the military side, a similar initiative is the work on the capabilities perfor-
med by the EDA. By developing European core operational concepts, that are both 
highly relevant in any crisis management operations and enable capabilities of 27 
member states to work together, interoperability is enhanced and the potential for 
pooling and sharing of capabilities is realized. 
There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as 
evidenced in the vision of ’integrated CSDP crisis management operations’ in the 
2016 Global Strategy, an increased focus on EUs neighborhood, as well as growing 
security concerns. Interoperability is a key enabler of Pooling and Sharing, both 
central mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management 
operations, as well as improving potential for cooperation between national actors. 
Although interoperability is often seen as mainly seen a cost saving mechanism, it 
builds common organizational culture and solidarity. Interoperability leads to more 
effective use of current capabilities and increases availability of resources for the 
States to deploy for EU, NATO, multinational or national purposes. In short: increa-
sing interoperability is one of the key mechanisms that EU can use to improve its 
effectiveness.
For further reading:
D6.1 Standardisation review. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D6.2 Identification of the overlap between, 2017. IECEU, 653371. 
D6.3 The interoperability of resources, 2017. IECEU, 653371.
D6.5 The potential for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities. 2017. IECEU, 
653371.
D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
References:
European Commission. 2017. A Europe that defends: Commission opens 
debate on moving towards a security and defence union. Brussels, 7 June 2017.
European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – 
A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.
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Foreword
Based on the 8 case studies and 12 missions/operations analysed within IECEU as 
well as three policy dialogues with relevant stakeholders and institutions, this 
chapter summarizes policy approaches and solutions as well as recommendations 
for further steps to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP crisis management and 
EU’s conflict prevention capabilities. From IECEU consortium, all beneficiaries have 
contributed to the tasks to analyse approaches and solutions in terms of enhance-
ment. This chapter is based on the work and studies conducted by IECEU researchers 
in WP7 New Approaches to improve the EU effectiveness. AIES has led the work 
from analysis towards identification and testing of new solutions. The work will be 
finalised by end of year 2017. 
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A transition towards more preventive activities?
The Lisbon Treaty highlights conflict prevention as key objective for EU’s foreign 
policy and external relations.52  The CSDP missions and operations are one part of the 
EU’s preventive engagement globally. The civilian missions and military operations 
together with diplomatic activities are the most visible conflict prevention activi-
ties. From the long-term perspective, the structural instruments such as regional 
cooperation, financial assistance through access to EU markets as well as security 
sector reform programmes aim to tackle the root causes of potential conflicts. On 
the other hand, the short-term preventive activities are operational policy dialo-
gues, mediation and peace talks, fact-finding and monitoring missions. Moreover, 
the economical and political sanctions can be seen as sort-term conflict prevention 
instruments or policies.53  
Council Conclusions on security and development54 highlighted the nexus between 
development and security and pursued conflict prevention as a priority goal. Also, 
the surveys conducted in the early stage of IECEU –project55 revealed a need for bet-
ter conference and understanding between EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuil-
ding thinking. The same studies showed the need for clearer linkages between EU’s 
operational missions and operations and political goals. Even the high ambitious 
of conflict prevention, the CSDP instruments were seen in a limited role as part of 
overall conflict prevention activities. The complexity of EU engagement and current 
conflict and crisis areas requires continuous assessment on the effectiveness of diffe-
rent conflict prevention and crisis management activities (see for example European 
Parliament, 2012). The challenges in this complexity are identified through several 
studies and research projects. The key focuses with recommendations are around 
knowledge management between policies and operational activities, interoperabi-
lity and learning from the lessons of CSDP missions and operations.56 
  
IECEU analyses from crisis management capabilities and 
lessons
By focusing on the six capabilities as defined in the methodology of the IECEU 
project, IECEU case studies led towards a proposal of 14 recommendations that 
are also further analysed and tested. The six core capabilities were identified and 
used to research the crisis management operations: 1) Planning, 2) Interoperability, 
52) The Treaty of Lisbon, entered into force on 1 December 2009.
53) IECEU –project, 2015. D1.2 Analysis of the current preventive activities. p. 11­13.
54) European Council, 2007. Conclusions of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States meeting within the Council on Security and Development. 
55) IECEU –project, 2015. D1.2 Analysis of the current preventive activities. p. 17.
56) See for example: IECEU –project, 2017. & European Parliament, 2012. CSDP Missions and Operations: 
Lessons Learned Processes. European Union, 2012. Directorate­General for External Policies, Policy 
Department. ISBN: 978­92­823­3756­1.
3) Competences, 4) Comprehensiveness, 5) Technology and 6) Operational capa-
city. The aim of the studies were to analyse and evaluate different case study areas 
where a CSDP mission or operation is or has taken place. The geographical varia-
tion was ensured by selecting the regions from different areas (Kosovo, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Central African Republic, DR Congo, 
Libya, occupied Palestinian Territories) and the variation of different mandates was 
also analysed. This was to ensure the descriptions of variations and in order to maxi-
mise the results. The triangulation and mixed methods aimed to meet with multiple 
interest that IECEU stakeholders and end users have related to effectiveness of EU’s 
crisis management capabilities. Each case study was completed by responsibility 
organisations and group of researchers. This was to ensure the understanding of 
context which is seen very relevant in research of conflicts and crisis management.
Recommendations on solutions
IECEU conducted the research analysis towards new policy approaches and solu-
tions that were presented along the lines of the identified six core capabilities 
used to research the crisis management operations (Planning, Interoperability, 
Competences, Comprehensiveness, Technology and Operational capacity). In 
total, 14 IECEU recommendations in order to improve EU’s crisis management and 
conflict prevention were categorised according to key focuses they had and in 
line with key stakeholders relevant from recommendation (e.g. political/strategic, 
Member State).  For each capability, the main points of the findings and recom-
mendations to overcome the identified problems are presented. The recommenda-
tions introduced in this chapter are presented under capabilities/themes of IECEU 
research. The more detailed descriptions and further analysis can be found from the 
final deliverables of IECEU WP7 (D7.1, D7.2 and D7.3).57 
1) Planning
“Civilian and military elements within the EU should, on future missions deployed in a crisis 
situation, combine the initial planning phase and remain in close partnership thereafter. The 
developments on this are already implemented in the structures of EEAS. Advanced commu­
nications between both the head of the military and the head of the civilian command and 
conduct capability at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent 
theatres on all aspects of the missions were analysed to be further developed. In order to 
support this kind of communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff 
exchange and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions. 
The desired end­state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect 
an appropriate action relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. 
Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people. Local actors 
should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to 
partner agencies. In the same vein, the mission should have more influence on the mission 
57) D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions. 2017. IECEU, 653371.
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implementation plan. A core planning team with accurate equipment should be immediately 
established on the ground in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic 
and planning documents accordingly.” Some developments on this are already imple-
mented in the structures of EEAS.
2) Interoperability
“Combined civilian and military platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in 
different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mind­set and culture. Tools to collect, 
analyse, store and share CSDP­related intelligence should be further developed and enhanced 
and interoperable, i.e. supporting a common operational picture for the crisis management 
operation (civilian and military). Continue the development of a shared platform for lessons 
identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management 
operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process.”
3) Competences
”At management level in crisis management operations, a separate test of soft skills could be 
beneficial, implemented in a standardized way.”
4) Comprehensiveness
”Review ways in which to strengthen both competences of mission and operations staff as 
well as creating or augmenting existing platforms in order to strengthen cooperation and 
coordination with other EU actors in the field.”
5) Technology
“Strengthen the technological component of missions in terms of having technologies that 
deliver in the field, with a key role for the mission support platform and sufficient funding to 
buy appropriate technological tools. Include in Pre Deployment training on available techno­
logy and equipment in the field. In CSDP crisis management operations, the starting point for 
selecting technologies for local capacity building should be sustainability.”
6) Operational capacity
“Deployment cycles ought to be managed in such a way that the proper execution of the mis­
sion is not endangered with the replacement of staff. Improvements in conflict analysis in 
advance of deployment should be made by involving the broad spectrum of civil society in 
order to have an accurate and timely local operational picture. All EU delegations and CSDP 
crisis management operations should have systems in place enabling the exchange of classi­
fied information.”
The testing of the lessons identified and recommendations were already imple-
mented partly during the policy dialogues and advisory board meetings organised 
in the Spring 2017. These discussions combined 86 external CSDP experts in total. 
The further research and testing (in October and November of 2017) will identify 
the key focuses from operational level towards political decision-making and more 
abstract discussions. Therefore, within the logic of WP7, the 14 recommendations 
will be further analysed in IECEU –project deliverable D7.3, where an assessment will 
be made, which of those recommendations have already been taken into considera-
tion and are currently in the process of being implemented. The IECEU team thus 
conducted a series of polls and interviews, which highlighted the following main 
recommendations: 
• Firstly, the recommendations focusing on ensuring that the local dimension 
of crisis management operations is sufficiently taken into account in the 
planning and execution phase;
• Secondly, the recommendations focusing on the technological component 
in pre-deployment training and crisis management operations). Both sets of 
recommendations are very different in nature. 
The first one is strategic, linking to the integrated approach, the cooperation of 
EU-delegations and EEAS and the role of the European Commission in the CSDP 
process. The second one is tactical/operational, focusing on the technological tools 
supporting the CMO staff and local actors. After discussing which one to prioritize 
for testing, it was decided that considering the nature of the IECEU project and its 
focus on effectiveness, the research will concentrate on how to make best use of the 
existing EU structures in order to properly implement the integrated approach or 
comprehensive approach.
However, taking into account the changing security environment and the variety of 
threats and challenges that the EU and its member states are confronted with and 
analyzing the current promising dynamics in security and defence policy within EU, 
the general question of how future crisis management will look like needs to be add-
ressed. It is indisputable that a more integrated and multi-dimensional approach 
to conflict and crisis is needed. Above all, the future of CSDP missions and conflict 
prevention will depend on whether they are effective or not. This requires not only 
a further strengthening of the strategic and operational capacities of the Union by 
taking into consideration the lessons learnt of past CMOs, but also allowing for an 
external assessment of the Union’s action. Only be establishing a strong knowledge 
base, the aim of the EU Global Strategy to provide for targeted approaches to resili-
ence, conflict prevention and resolution can be properly achieved.
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For further reading:
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9. RESEARCH MEETS POLICY – 
TOWARDS A CULTURE OF EXTERNAL 
ASSESSMENT
Petteri Taitto, Laurea UAS
 
T he EU CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) is a Member States owned activity and process, and therefore it poses certain challenges and political sensitivities to the missions and operations planning, conduct and 
evaluation. As long as Member States, with their own national agendas, are defining 
requirements, planning missions and evaluating themselves in the field of CSDP, 
the process will be based on politically ‘polished’ reporting of activities, rather than 
real lessons. 
The EEAS (European External Action Service) formal Lessons process includes 
different actors from the EEAS and from relevant Commission directorates, like 
DEVCO (Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid), ECHO 
(Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid) and NEAR (Directorate-General for 
Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations). Over the last five years the process 
has successfully identified lessons and followed the implementation of the recom-
mendations in the EU external action. However, this does not exclude the fact that 
the evaluator and sources of information are coming from the structures of the 
EEAS.
The IECEU –project has published numerous scientific reviews, that are reflected 
against the 260 interviews done in the CSDP missions and operations. This research 
has led to recommendations for policy makers, operational actors and training ins-
titutions in different areas like: planning and operational capacities, competences, 
comprehensiveness, interoperability and technology. All of these areas have been 
presented respectively in the policy dialogues in the course of the project, and results 
of these dialogues have been further integrated to the recommendations. Therefore, 
the IECEU as such can be seen as external assessment of the CSDP missions over the 
last three years.
The IECEU project has shown that there is a certainly a difference between evalua-
ting yourself or by an independent and external actor, who possesses scientific 
expertise with evaluation. The IECEU project has revealed that there seems to lack a 
proper plan, how to implement quality assurance cycle following up on policies and 
defining whether they are implemented. Therefore a periodic independent external 
assessment is considered as indispensable for having an objective evaluation. This 
is not to substitute, rather complement, the existing EEAS Lessons process by pro-
viding objective support when examining the policies and practices in the missions 
and operations. The external research can find real shortfalls, but also good practices 
that can be further strengthened in the future policies and guidelines.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIES Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy
AMA The Palestinian-Israeli Agreement on Movement and Access
ANP Afghan National Police
BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina 
C2 Command and Control
C3 Control and Communication
CEP Centre for European Perspective
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CMC Crisis Management Concept
CMC Crisis Management Center Finland
CONOPs Concept of Operations
CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP/ESDP The EU Common Security and Defence Policy/(prior to the Lisbon Treaty) the European Security and Defence Policy
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DG ECHO Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid
DG DEVCO Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid
DG NEAR Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
DPI Directorate of Police Intelligence
EEAS European External Action Service
ENTRi Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management
ESDC European Security and Defence College
EU European Union
EUAVSEC European Union Aviation Security Mission
EUBAM The European Union Border Assistance Mission
EU COPPS EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUFOR European Union Force
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo 
EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUPOL The European Union Police Mission
EUPST European Union Police Services Training
EUSR European Union Special Representative
GABC Palestinian General Administration for Borders and Crossings
GPPT German Police Project Team
HQ Headquarters
HR Human Resources
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IBM Integrated Border Management
IDF Israeli Defence Forces
IECEU Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention
ILP Intelligence-Led Policing
IPA Instrument for Pre-accession assistance 
IPCB International Police Co-Ordination Board
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
JSR Justice Sector Reform
MMA Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising
MIP Mission Implementation Plan
MOI Ministry of Interior
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NMLA New Media based Learning Application 
NSF Palestinian National Security Force
NUIM National University of Ireland, Maynooth
OPLAN Operational Plan
OPTs The occupied Palestinian territories
PA (PNA) The Palestinian Authority
PCOP Provincial Chief of Police
PCP The Palestinian Civil Police
PLC The Palestinian Legislative Council
PR Public Relations
PSC Political and Security Committee
RCP Rafah Crossing Point
RDCC Roskilde University and Royal Danish Defence College
SOMA Status of Mission Agreement
SSMI Strategic Support for Ministry of Interior
SSR Security Sector reform
UACES Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies
UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan
UNWRA The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
US United States
USAID United States Aid
WOSCAP Whole-of-Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding
WP Work Package
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As the European Union tries to increase its influence and relevance 
in EU external actions, it first has to reach a common understanding 
on how to, in the most efficient way possible, embark on this jour-
ney. A journey, which has the possibility to make a real difference and 
impact generations to come, if the EU has done its homework proper-
ly. This publication, based on the Improving the Effectiveness of the C 
apabilities in EU conflict prevention (IECEU) – project (funded by the 
European Commission H2020 Research Programme) provides lessons 
identified from eight different case studies and recommendations for 
the EU on how to improve the effectiveness and capabilities in future 
crisis management operations and conflict prevention, whether they be 
civilian, military or a combination of both.  
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